ECONOMY
Is Domodedovo Airport a Turning Point in the Wartime Nationalization Campaign?
July 8, 2025
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Andrei Shashkov
Journalist
Journalist Andrei Shashkov discusses the recent nationalization of the airport, which may herald a whole new era of property redistribution and a rewriting of the rules of the game in Russia.
The original piece in Russian was published in Republic and is being republished here with their permission.
In June, the Moscow Region Arbitration Court, in a case brought by the Prosecutor General’s Office, ruled to nationalize DME Holding, which controls Domodedovo Airport. The asset will be temporarily managed by Rosimushchestvo. The formal reason: Dmitri Kamenshchik, the now-former owner, is reported to also have citizenship of Turkey and the UAE, hence the ownership structure could expose the airport, an entity of strategic importance, to the risk of foreign influence.
Kamenshchik is prohibited from leaving Russia in connection with the case.
In June, the Moscow Region Arbitration Court, in a case brought by the Prosecutor General’s Office, ruled to nationalize DME Holding, which controls Domodedovo Airport. The asset will be temporarily managed by Rosimushchestvo. The formal reason: Dmitri Kamenshchik, the now-former owner, is reported to also have citizenship of Turkey and the UAE, hence the ownership structure could expose the airport, an entity of strategic importance, to the risk of foreign influence.
Kamenshchik is prohibited from leaving Russia in connection with the case.
Passenger Terminal, Domodedovo Airport. Source: Wiki Commons
Chronicle of the airport’s nationalization
The first attempt to seize Domodedovo was made back in the 2000s. Even by the standards of that time, including the Yukos case, it was quite unusual. Back then, under the guise of a campaign to “bring order” to strategic assets, the state began to pressure the ownership of the airport, unleashing the siloviki and loyal media.
On January 24, 2011, a terrorist attack took place at Domodedovo: a suicide bomber blew himself up in the international arrivals area. Thirty-seven people were killed and more than 170 were injured. Criminal cases were opened against the owners of Domodedovo, and mass searches and inspections carried out.
The authorities tried to challenge the legality of the airport’s privatization and demanded that the ultimate beneficiaries be disclosed.
Kamenshchik was made out to be almost public enemy number one: while other major businessmen were forced to emigrate or agree to deals with the state, he chose to wage a public battle and fight off the attacks in court.
The first attempt to seize Domodedovo was made back in the 2000s. Even by the standards of that time, including the Yukos case, it was quite unusual. Back then, under the guise of a campaign to “bring order” to strategic assets, the state began to pressure the ownership of the airport, unleashing the siloviki and loyal media.
On January 24, 2011, a terrorist attack took place at Domodedovo: a suicide bomber blew himself up in the international arrivals area. Thirty-seven people were killed and more than 170 were injured. Criminal cases were opened against the owners of Domodedovo, and mass searches and inspections carried out.
The authorities tried to challenge the legality of the airport’s privatization and demanded that the ultimate beneficiaries be disclosed.
Kamenshchik was made out to be almost public enemy number one: while other major businessmen were forced to emigrate or agree to deals with the state, he chose to wage a public battle and fight off the attacks in court.
“Despite the best efforts of the siloviki and attempts to play the ‘national interest’ card, the Domodedovo case stalled in 2011.”
Kamenshchik, formally or informally, managed to retain control of Domodedovo, largely thanks to skillful lawyers, support from part of the elite and the track record of the airport as one of the few truly effective private infrastructure projects in the country.
In April, the FT wrote that Kamenshchik had been offered by “people close to the government and security services” last year to “gift” 25% of the airport to the state. The deal was if he agreed to give up the stake, he would be able to save the rest of the business and avoid further problems.
The FT suggests such proposals have become typical for big Russian business in the new political reality. Perhaps Kamenshchik misplayed his hand, reckoning that this was an offer he could refuse.
At the country’s once-largest airport in terms of passenger traffic, passengers have halved over the last five years, while leverage, as measured by the debt versus EBITDA, has risen to dangerous levels, the Bell reports, citing economists.
Still, Domodedovo remains one of the largest transport infrastructure sites in the country. Meanwhile, Kommersant values the 25 companies controlled by DME Holding at a trillion rubles.
In April, the FT wrote that Kamenshchik had been offered by “people close to the government and security services” last year to “gift” 25% of the airport to the state. The deal was if he agreed to give up the stake, he would be able to save the rest of the business and avoid further problems.
The FT suggests such proposals have become typical for big Russian business in the new political reality. Perhaps Kamenshchik misplayed his hand, reckoning that this was an offer he could refuse.
At the country’s once-largest airport in terms of passenger traffic, passengers have halved over the last five years, while leverage, as measured by the debt versus EBITDA, has risen to dangerous levels, the Bell reports, citing economists.
Still, Domodedovo remains one of the largest transport infrastructure sites in the country. Meanwhile, Kommersant values the 25 companies controlled by DME Holding at a trillion rubles.
“DME Holding is worth almost all the businesses that Russia nationalized last year.”
Duma Budget Committee Chair Andrei Makarov. Source: YouTube
Yet President Putin, commenting on the situation at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), said “the fuss surrounding this facility has persisted for quite some time.”
Even the carefully selected loyalists who came with Putin to SPIEF were not so unperturbed.
Cautious disagreement
CBR chief Elvira Nabiullina cautiously but openly – and not for the first time – made it clear that she considers nationalization with subsequent transfer to the “right” owners to be a problem.
She was supported by Sberbank head German Gref and Duma Budget Committee Chair Andrei Makarov, who moderated the session with Nabiullina.
Nevertheless, all these statements were rather “between the lines”; there is no and never was any explicit dissatisfaction with nationalization.
The head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Alexander Shokhin, joined this timid chorus, saying “to be honest, I am not 100% sure that the arguments for taking Domodedovo from private to state ownership were chosen correctly.”
In addition, Shokhin warned that the new owner may lose the asset in the future due to the peculiarities of how it was seized from Kamenshchik: “if in 10 years, say, or 15 years, they come to the conclusion that this asset was taken over incorrectly, it can be taken away from the private owner again and privatized again.” And this applies not only to Domodedovo.
Steadily widening nationalization
In the spring, Novaya Gazeta Europe and Ilya Shumanov estimated that over the three years of the war in Ukraine, almost 500 companies had been nationalized/”re-privatizaed” for a total of RUB 2.5 trillion (with Domodedovo, it is now at least RUB 3.5 trillion – the annual GDP of Cyprus or Georgia).
Even the carefully selected loyalists who came with Putin to SPIEF were not so unperturbed.
Cautious disagreement
CBR chief Elvira Nabiullina cautiously but openly – and not for the first time – made it clear that she considers nationalization with subsequent transfer to the “right” owners to be a problem.
She was supported by Sberbank head German Gref and Duma Budget Committee Chair Andrei Makarov, who moderated the session with Nabiullina.
Nevertheless, all these statements were rather “between the lines”; there is no and never was any explicit dissatisfaction with nationalization.
The head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Alexander Shokhin, joined this timid chorus, saying “to be honest, I am not 100% sure that the arguments for taking Domodedovo from private to state ownership were chosen correctly.”
In addition, Shokhin warned that the new owner may lose the asset in the future due to the peculiarities of how it was seized from Kamenshchik: “if in 10 years, say, or 15 years, they come to the conclusion that this asset was taken over incorrectly, it can be taken away from the private owner again and privatized again.” And this applies not only to Domodedovo.
Steadily widening nationalization
In the spring, Novaya Gazeta Europe and Ilya Shumanov estimated that over the three years of the war in Ukraine, almost 500 companies had been nationalized/”re-privatizaed” for a total of RUB 2.5 trillion (with Domodedovo, it is now at least RUB 3.5 trillion – the annual GDP of Cyprus or Georgia).
“The current nationalization is several times bigger than what the oligarchs got through the loans-for-shares auctions in the 1990s.”
If what is happening now is, in Putin’s words, nothing more than a “fuss,” then what happened then?
Note that in the current cases the statute of limitations is calculated from the date the prosecutor’s investigation concludes, rather than from when the privatization deal was officially registered.
Some experts claim this is a de facto abolition of the statute of limitations.
Meanwhile, Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told Republic that the seizure of Domodedovo does not represent a new level of redistribution of property for the regime:
“As far as I understand, there was always a desire to take the asset, but there was no team before. And [DME Holding Chair Valery] Kogan and Kamenshchik were good at building connections with all the necessary major players. And this saved them for a long time.
Besides, the business was quite transparent for a long time, and there was simply nothing to latch onto. But now the situation is different – the airport is in debt. And, apparently, such is the political will that now the owner must be changed. As far as I know, Kamenshchik and Kogan have already tried all the options, both formal and informal, to fight back. But their luck has run out.
I am not sure that with this seizure, the process has really reached a new level. Rather… Domodedovo is simply the largest asset in a series of many [nationalizations] currently. The process itself has become routine. The same thing happens literally every day, just with smaller businesses.
Note that in the current cases the statute of limitations is calculated from the date the prosecutor’s investigation concludes, rather than from when the privatization deal was officially registered.
Some experts claim this is a de facto abolition of the statute of limitations.
Meanwhile, Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told Republic that the seizure of Domodedovo does not represent a new level of redistribution of property for the regime:
“As far as I understand, there was always a desire to take the asset, but there was no team before. And [DME Holding Chair Valery] Kogan and Kamenshchik were good at building connections with all the necessary major players. And this saved them for a long time.
Besides, the business was quite transparent for a long time, and there was simply nothing to latch onto. But now the situation is different – the airport is in debt. And, apparently, such is the political will that now the owner must be changed. As far as I know, Kamenshchik and Kogan have already tried all the options, both formal and informal, to fight back. But their luck has run out.
I am not sure that with this seizure, the process has really reached a new level. Rather… Domodedovo is simply the largest asset in a series of many [nationalizations] currently. The process itself has become routine. The same thing happens literally every day, just with smaller businesses.
“In this sense, Domodedovo is another in a series of sad episodes where the Prosecutor General’s Office acts in someone’s (clearly not the state’s) interests.”
This is fraught with further erosion of the boundaries of property rights. Accordingly, some players in the market have a growing appetite to add some new assets. The other players are in a panic and feverishly searching for new resources for protection, so as not to part with their property. In this sense, it is very reminiscent of the 1990s.”
At SPIEF, Putin also stressed that “nationalization is a process stipulated by law. We do not enforce this law or its provisions.” He called Domodedovo another “dispute between entities… that did not emerge recently.” Finally, even though he claimed that privatization was “from a standpoint of social justice… far from perfect,” he said “it would be an even bigger mistake to reverse everything now.”
The seizure of big assets is reminiscent of the events of Putin’s first term, with NTV and Yukos in particular. The Kremlin, with renewed vigor, is taking back property from those who are not close enough and handing it to those who are.
At SPIEF, Putin also stressed that “nationalization is a process stipulated by law. We do not enforce this law or its provisions.” He called Domodedovo another “dispute between entities… that did not emerge recently.” Finally, even though he claimed that privatization was “from a standpoint of social justice… far from perfect,” he said “it would be an even bigger mistake to reverse everything now.”
The seizure of big assets is reminiscent of the events of Putin’s first term, with NTV and Yukos in particular. The Kremlin, with renewed vigor, is taking back property from those who are not close enough and handing it to those who are.
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