Society
The Majority of Russians Do Not Want to Fight, But a Minority Will Suffice for the Kremlin
July 7, 2025
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Sergei Shelin
Journalist, independent analyst and author of Russia After Putin and Trump
(Freedom Letters, 2025)
Journalist Sergei Shelin argues that, contrary to earlier expectations that the Kremlin would struggle to compensate for mounting losses in its war against Ukraine, Putin’s military is not facing a shortage of contract soldiers. Recruits are enlisting faster than soldiers are being killed.
The original text in Russian was published in the Moscow Times and is being republished here with the author’s permission.
VTsIOM has asked Russians who they consider “the real heroes of Russia.”
Not going for it
As an appetizer, respondents were asked whether they agreed that “the real heroes of Russia are not only those who defend the country with weapons in their hands, but also those who work every day for the benefit of society.” As expected, respondents expressed agreement. Of those under 25, 99% did so, with the other age cohorts not far behind.
VTsIOM then asked the loaded question: “in the event of a direct, serious threat to the country – a war or natural disaster – would you be ready or not to serve the Motherland? If so, how?” Among the five responses to choose from, there was “by taking part in the armed defense of the country.”
But the pollster failed to trick Russians. The response of “armed defense” garnered only 23%, finishing at the bottom of the list and losing out to “volunteer work” (53%), “professional assistance” (34%; apparently meaning continuing to work at the same place as before) and even “informational support” (24%; likely understood as making patriotic statements in free time). The “armed defense” response was as equally unpopular as “financial support” (23%). Respondents likely assume that at a critical time the government will confiscate their money without asking.
VTsIOM has asked Russians who they consider “the real heroes of Russia.”
Not going for it
As an appetizer, respondents were asked whether they agreed that “the real heroes of Russia are not only those who defend the country with weapons in their hands, but also those who work every day for the benefit of society.” As expected, respondents expressed agreement. Of those under 25, 99% did so, with the other age cohorts not far behind.
VTsIOM then asked the loaded question: “in the event of a direct, serious threat to the country – a war or natural disaster – would you be ready or not to serve the Motherland? If so, how?” Among the five responses to choose from, there was “by taking part in the armed defense of the country.”
But the pollster failed to trick Russians. The response of “armed defense” garnered only 23%, finishing at the bottom of the list and losing out to “volunteer work” (53%), “professional assistance” (34%; apparently meaning continuing to work at the same place as before) and even “informational support” (24%; likely understood as making patriotic statements in free time). The “armed defense” response was as equally unpopular as “financial support” (23%). Respondents likely assume that at a critical time the government will confiscate their money without asking.
“Even more telling is that young Russians expressed the least desire to ‘take part in the armed defense of the country’.”
Among those under 33, this response easily ranked last (17-20%). The age group most ready to take up arms to defend the Motherland were 50- and 60-year-olds (33%), yet even their fighting spirit cannot be called robust.
An undesirable question
To be fair, we should note that men in all age groups were significantly more ready to go to the front than women. But even men, in the VTsIOM, put volunteering and “professional help” at the top of the list.
Today, fighting in a war is not an abstraction for Russians. Every Russian has already thought through such a possibility. Thus, their responses deserve serious attention. Even with the obvious caveat that at least some of those polled by VTsIOM were guided by considerations of social desirability and loyalty to the regime.
As we can see, fighting is so undesirable for the majority of Russians that, despite their almost universal loyalty and willingness to give the “right” answer, they do not really conceal this attitude from the country’s leadership.
The state survey takers probably came to the same conclusion.
The extreme unpopularity of any indiscriminate mobilization was confirmed, though it was not directly asked about.
An undesirable question
To be fair, we should note that men in all age groups were significantly more ready to go to the front than women. But even men, in the VTsIOM, put volunteering and “professional help” at the top of the list.
Today, fighting in a war is not an abstraction for Russians. Every Russian has already thought through such a possibility. Thus, their responses deserve serious attention. Even with the obvious caveat that at least some of those polled by VTsIOM were guided by considerations of social desirability and loyalty to the regime.
As we can see, fighting is so undesirable for the majority of Russians that, despite their almost universal loyalty and willingness to give the “right” answer, they do not really conceal this attitude from the country’s leadership.
The state survey takers probably came to the same conclusion.
The extreme unpopularity of any indiscriminate mobilization was confirmed, though it was not directly asked about.
“Thus, the regime’s ability to continue the war with Ukraine without a draft depends entirely on whether it can ensure a steady flow of kontraktniki mercenaries.”
Flyer for contract service in the "special operation." Text on the flyer: "Join the army of victory. One-time payment of 4 million rubles (over $37,000 USD), salaries starting at 260,000 rubles per month (about $2,400 USD). Guaranteed by the state". Source: VK
Some analysts, including your author, until recently believed that Putin would be unable to compensate for the growing losses in Ukraine this year and that no later than end-2025 he would have to either, contrary to the wishes of the majority of the country, announce a draft or seek peace.
Let’s see how this squares with the latest data.
With so many kontraktniki, big losses are no cause for concern
First, about Russian losses. Mediazona and the BBC Russian service keep a list of killed Russian soldiers that already runs to more than 115,000 names. About 5,000 are added every month.
The actual number of casualties is, by many estimates, twice as high. For example, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) puts it at 250,000 men. If so, then the monthly death toll should double to 10,000, which seems quite plausible.
It is harder to estimate all “irrecoverable” Russian losses, i.e., those killed plus those wounded who have not returned to duty. The available estimates are rather rough. If we assume the number of seriously wounded is equal to the number of those killed, then irrecoverable losses would be 20,000 a month.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky claims that last month (June), Russian irrecoverable losses amounted to 32,000. Apparently, the real number is somewhere between these two figures.
Meanwhile, the flow of Russian men going to fight in Ukraine (i.e., kontraktniki and so-called volunteers), according to Russian military officials, reached 190,000 in the first five months of 2025, an average of 38,000 a month. If this is so – these numbers are congruous both with reports on last year’s pull and with plans for this year – then the net flow of Russian troops is positive 10,000 a month.
Though the reports of Russian officials may be exaggerated, the fact is that Russian forces on the front line and in the near rear are actually growing.
Now let’s try to assess how long this trend can continue.
Russian irrecoverable losses throughout the three and a half years of the war are estimated at no less than 500,000 (estimate of UK intelligence) or even 1 million (the Ukrainian General Staff).
Let’s see how this squares with the latest data.
With so many kontraktniki, big losses are no cause for concern
First, about Russian losses. Mediazona and the BBC Russian service keep a list of killed Russian soldiers that already runs to more than 115,000 names. About 5,000 are added every month.
The actual number of casualties is, by many estimates, twice as high. For example, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) puts it at 250,000 men. If so, then the monthly death toll should double to 10,000, which seems quite plausible.
It is harder to estimate all “irrecoverable” Russian losses, i.e., those killed plus those wounded who have not returned to duty. The available estimates are rather rough. If we assume the number of seriously wounded is equal to the number of those killed, then irrecoverable losses would be 20,000 a month.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky claims that last month (June), Russian irrecoverable losses amounted to 32,000. Apparently, the real number is somewhere between these two figures.
Meanwhile, the flow of Russian men going to fight in Ukraine (i.e., kontraktniki and so-called volunteers), according to Russian military officials, reached 190,000 in the first five months of 2025, an average of 38,000 a month. If this is so – these numbers are congruous both with reports on last year’s pull and with plans for this year – then the net flow of Russian troops is positive 10,000 a month.
Though the reports of Russian officials may be exaggerated, the fact is that Russian forces on the front line and in the near rear are actually growing.
Now let’s try to assess how long this trend can continue.
Russian irrecoverable losses throughout the three and a half years of the war are estimated at no less than 500,000 (estimate of UK intelligence) or even 1 million (the Ukrainian General Staff).
“Currently, if Putin is to be believed, about 700,000 Russians are fighting against Ukraine.”
Without trying to be precise, I will therefore say the total number of Russian military personnel who have somehow been involved in this war is unlikely to be less than 1.5 million.
Does Putin have the manpower to continue going through cannon fodder at this rate? Recall that the majority of Russians will not volunteer for this war for any amount of money.
One in every 10 is enough
In total, there are about 30 million men between 20 and 50 years old in Russia. They are the ones fighting in Ukraine; almost all Russian casualties are in this age range. Let’s assume, for simplicity’s sake, that half of the 30 million are fit for service – 15 million. This means only one in every 10 has been “spent” so far.
Now let’s see where Putin gets his recruits from. We will rely on the data on killed Russian soldiers, since this is the most detailed statistics.
Does Putin have the manpower to continue going through cannon fodder at this rate? Recall that the majority of Russians will not volunteer for this war for any amount of money.
One in every 10 is enough
In total, there are about 30 million men between 20 and 50 years old in Russia. They are the ones fighting in Ukraine; almost all Russian casualties are in this age range. Let’s assume, for simplicity’s sake, that half of the 30 million are fit for service – 15 million. This means only one in every 10 has been “spent” so far.
Now let’s see where Putin gets his recruits from. We will rely on the data on killed Russian soldiers, since this is the most detailed statistics.
“In terms of soldiers confirmed killed relative to men aged 20 to 61 living in the region, Moscow (four dead per 10,000 male residents) lags Tyva (120 dead) by a factor of thirty.”
This is Summer is a Moscow project running from June 1 through September 14 with festivals, performances, exercises, concerts and competitions. Source: VK
No Muscovite with any semblance of a decent life is even propositioned to go and die in this war.
Tyva is a special case: hopeless poverty and the highest crime rate in Russia, meaning lots of convicts living there. In addition, there are military units based in Tuva, which even in peacetime recruited many locals.
But Moscow also lags, in terms of soldier mortality, rather ordinary regions by 8-10 times: Bashkortostan (43 deaths per 10,000 male residents), Pskov (42) and Sverdlovsk (32). In these places, there are categories of men and entire areas that supply Putin with big numbers of recruits and, it seems, will continue doing so.
The regime shows little concern about recruitment. The once-staggering growth of signing bonuses for kontraktniki has been flat for several months now.
Meanwhile, lowering the minimum age to sign a contract to include 18-year-olds, right out of high school, is more likely to formalize mercenary recruitment practices than to seriously expand the pool of recruits.
This pool is not particularly deep, but for now it is clearly sufficient.
Tyva is a special case: hopeless poverty and the highest crime rate in Russia, meaning lots of convicts living there. In addition, there are military units based in Tuva, which even in peacetime recruited many locals.
But Moscow also lags, in terms of soldier mortality, rather ordinary regions by 8-10 times: Bashkortostan (43 deaths per 10,000 male residents), Pskov (42) and Sverdlovsk (32). In these places, there are categories of men and entire areas that supply Putin with big numbers of recruits and, it seems, will continue doing so.
The regime shows little concern about recruitment. The once-staggering growth of signing bonuses for kontraktniki has been flat for several months now.
Meanwhile, lowering the minimum age to sign a contract to include 18-year-olds, right out of high school, is more likely to formalize mercenary recruitment practices than to seriously expand the pool of recruits.
This pool is not particularly deep, but for now it is clearly sufficient.
“The regime has already swallowed one and a half million men, and if it needs another million or one and a half million, it will probably manage to get them.”
After all, this is only a tenth of those eligible for service.
At the same time, hiring and sending an even higher number of men to Ukraine is hardly realistic. Putin has only a minority of the country at his disposal. The majority do not want to become mercenaries. Still, the number he does have should be enough not only for this year but, perhaps, for next year as well.
But could it be that Putin is being deceived by his inner circle and in reality Russia has no manpower reserves? This does not fit with what we are seeing. Putin’s refusal to make minimal concessions to Ukraine, and his obvious calculation for a successful summer-fall campaign, indicates he does not consider cannon fodder to be an urgent problem. He is more likely to be concerned with imbalances in the economy or unfavorable external developments.
With regard to the “civilian” majority, the ruler is following yet another unwritten contract. This majority is allowed to be almost completely unafraid of mobilization and to watch the war from their couches; in return, it does not interfere with Putin’s prosecution of the war and, as the VTsIOM survey indicated, is always at hand to help him “informationally,” “professionally” and even “financially” – as long as they are not sent to the front lines.
At the same time, hiring and sending an even higher number of men to Ukraine is hardly realistic. Putin has only a minority of the country at his disposal. The majority do not want to become mercenaries. Still, the number he does have should be enough not only for this year but, perhaps, for next year as well.
But could it be that Putin is being deceived by his inner circle and in reality Russia has no manpower reserves? This does not fit with what we are seeing. Putin’s refusal to make minimal concessions to Ukraine, and his obvious calculation for a successful summer-fall campaign, indicates he does not consider cannon fodder to be an urgent problem. He is more likely to be concerned with imbalances in the economy or unfavorable external developments.
With regard to the “civilian” majority, the ruler is following yet another unwritten contract. This majority is allowed to be almost completely unafraid of mobilization and to watch the war from their couches; in return, it does not interfere with Putin’s prosecution of the war and, as the VTsIOM survey indicated, is always at hand to help him “informationally,” “professionally” and even “financially” – as long as they are not sent to the front lines.
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