The original text in Russian was published in Republic. A shortened version is republished here with their permission.

The latest research by Levada (here and here) showed that in April, Russians’ support for Russian forces in Ukraine ticked up, while at the same time the share of respondents advocating a transition to peace negotiations also rose. Can this be explained by increasing polarization?

I do not think that’s it. On the one hand, there is an ongoing conflict in which the majority support the Russian side in one way or another. But at the same time, fatigue is gradually accumulating: we support our guys, but better if this ended as soon as possible. Moreover, I would call attention to the terms they want for the peace negotiations – only a fifth say it is necessary to make some concessions to Ukraine. In other words: yes, it should end, but there is no need to make concessions either. Here is the unspoken, unrationalized feeling of fatigue.

They have been talking about rising war fatigue in Russia since last year, so what is new about that?

It still continues to build up, albeit slowly. People are dying and there is no end in sight. The biggest number of people forpeace talks came last year during the announcement of the mobilization. But as the mobilization went away, the fear died down, and the number for negotiations declined. Overall, that position prevails: according to our data, it has not fallenbelow half.

There is a desire prevailing: let it all end soon and not bother us. A significant part [of the public] continues to followwhat is happening in Ukraine, but people who support the Russian side are watching the situation most closely. And those who are not for become shut in their own bubble. People have explained that watching the progress of a war is a traumatic experience, especially when nothing can be done about it. As our respondents say, their capacity for worry has been exhausted. They, of course, continue to follow events, but are already less emotionally involved.

In April, there was a frightening situation with the law on electronic draft notices. How did it affect the state of society?

It did not seem to have any effect. In autumn, the sentiment indicator plummeted – in 30 years of observation, there hadnever been such a sharp decline. But then that fear went away. Apparently, the most restless people left, and a significant part reasoned that this could be a threat, but not right now. Though if we look at emotions, then Russians who carefully followed what was happening reacted rather negatively to this electronic register.

Are the commentators and analysts right who believe that, in light of that sharp reaction in autumn, the Kremlin still will not dare to launch a new mass mobilization?

I would put it more carefully. I think that the Kremlin saw that and is trying to avoid a second wave of mass mobilization, which has scared everyone.

Now, we are seeing huge efforts across the country to recruit people by offering them money, to get them to sign a contract to serve, advertising it on posters and commercials.

How was the war in Syria treated: “Where is this Syria and where are we? Do not bother us and do what you want.” With Ukraine, that is not entirely the case, but the model is something like: “It’s bad, people are dying, but what can we do? And thank God that it is not happening here.”

I mean ordinary Russians, because the active part of society continues to be persecuted and pressured.

Z-propagandists still continue to insist that the authorities should declare martial law and call a general mobilization, and all the people should rise up and participate in the war. Why is the Kremlin producing such conflicting messages?

Propagandists primarily work on the older generation. And we see that older people, especially men, think in thecategories that propagandists tell them. It is among the older generations and TV viewers that the idea resonates that Russia is fighting fascism and Nazism. But the majority in Russian society do not repeat these phrases. Rather they say that “my country may be wrong, but I support it because I support our guys.” But that propaganda will capture some, and some will be able to be mobilized for contract service [in the army].

Is that why mostly middle-aged men voluntarily go to fight as contract soldiers?

There is no single criterion here, but judging by the way the latest propaganda campaigns are built – first and foremost they are about money, the opportunity to escape from poverty, from a hopeless state. Firstly, it is people who have not found themselves in civilian life, who have no opportunities. But there must still be a certain ideological filling. Yes, you are going to fight to solve your material problems, but you need to justify this to yourself, and determine who is bad and who is good, and I think that propaganda actually fulfills these tasks.

Your research has shown that respondents are most concerned about the death of civilians, “the special operationitself,” the dragging on of the conflict and the death of Russian soldiers. It turns out that the imperial ideas thatRussians are accused of harboring are not interesting for them?

From the very beginning, people have said that war is bad, even those who support Russia’s actions in Ukraine. I hear such comments: “I would like to do without it, but what else could we have done?” For the majority, Russia is a victim in this conflict – they say: “We are not to blame, we are defending ourselves.”

But not so much from Ukraine – people in Russia believe that there is a war with the West, which it unleashed against them. The supply of Western weapons to Ukraine only reinforces this perception.
People understand that anyway the regime will do what it needs to do. A very large number of people have this in the back of their minds: “Whatever we say here, whatever we want, it doesn’t matter – what’s important is that Putin and the regime will decide for us anyway and they won’t ask us.”

That is not unconditional support. There is a core group, which is the older generation, older male supporters of the regime. These “hawks” are somewhere around 20-25% of all supporters [of Russia’s actions in Ukraine], somewhere around 45% do not ask many questions. And another 30% – they have their doubts, say that everything is bad, but since the authorities started it, let them finish it, nothing depends on us.

Returning to the growing anxiety and fatigue – how undesirable and dangerous are they for the Kremlin?

We should not assume – and the regime, I think, does not assume – that they will continue to build up forever. But here, I think, the regime is counting on the fact that the government will change in the West and support for Ukraine will end. And our own people will suffer for the time being, but they cannot really do anything about it.

The Kremlin is making a lot of efforts to keep the mood in society stable, because it understands very well that this conflict is a great stress for society, both economically and emotionally, and that more and more people are being drawn into it, and there are victims.

What can break this state of stable fatigue in Russian society?

We see that two thirds of Russians are concerned about a [Ukrainian] counteroffensive, another three quarters about the supply of Western weapons. But so far, all this has not seriously affected the broad mood. As for consumer confidence, the growth of anxiety about this came to a halt in our latest survey, though it did not drop either. At the beginning of last year, there was great enthusiasm in society related to consolidation around the regime, the flag, and it continues to have an effect. At the end of the year, economic factors began to take effect, as payments were made to mobilized men and their families.

Fewer people say the economic situation within their families is getting worse. And this seems to me to be one of the main drivers of moderately positive sentiment, which the Ukraine events have little effect on.

At the same time, there is a strong desire for peace talks. I repeat, not concessions to Ukraine, but a desire that all this would just end, people would stop dying, the authorities would stop calling up fellow citizens, relatives and friends. And this fatigue, I repeat, continues to build.

In February, you said that Russian society could have enough endurance for months or even a couple of years. Do you feel the same way now?

So far there have been no big changes. They can occur, as I have already said, due to the economic situation, the situation at the front, a second wave of mobilization. For now, the baseline scenario is still valid.

But besides the war itself, the deaths of soldiers, the deaths of civilians in Russia, more and more war-related horror is happening in Russia itself. Wagner prisoners who were freed from prison to fight in Ukraine are killingpeople on roads at night. Svetlana Petriychuk and Yevgeniya Berkovich, a playwright and director, have beenimprisoned for a play that had been running for three years in theaters. Why does this news not change people’s attitude toward the regime?

As for the play, consider that these repressions are committed against the active part of society, those who protest. Here, it seems, the government simply seeks to shut up any dissenters. Severe pressure on journalists, on the creative milieu does not concern ordinary Russians – they are not interested. Many do not know about it and do not want to know.

Thus, I would separate the well-being of active, dissenting, opposition-minded people from ordinary people.

As for acts of cruelty committed by people who have come back from the war, so far these are isolated cases, and overallthere was plenty of cruelty in Russia without them.

Looking forward, the increase in the level of violence and crime will affect public sentiment, but most people have simply not yet come back. Journalists are beginning to sound the alarm, but ordinary people have not yet felt this.

The Kremlin seems to be trying to connect in the public’s mind the liberal, dissenting milieu with terrorists. We see this in the new criminal cases against Navalny, who is being blamed for the murder of Z-propagandist Vladlen Tatarsky. Will the Kremlin be able to make the public believe that connection?

So far, society does not really believe it. Last year, we asked the question who the foreign agents and national traitors that Putin references are, and in the first place it was the oligarchs, Biden and well-known people who had fled. Soon, we will publish the results of a survey about Tatarsky, and there 1% or 2% connect his murder with the opposition.

A few years ago, we asked about the explosions at Domodedovo Airport, and this time in the survey about Tatarsky we simply repeated the questions with a slight modification: did you hear who was behind it? And Russians mostly answered that the Ukrainian special services did it, and people have not picked up the version that the Russian opposition wasinvolved. Society as a whole is rather passive, which is both good and bad at the same time. On the one hand, there is no great desire to participate in politics, because there is no faith that anything can be done. On the other hand, they also do not particularly believe in all these conspiracies and traitors, though the topic is constantly being discussed.
There is much more anger and resentment among Russians toward the West and their own government, channeled toward regional officials, so far not the central [government].