Society
‘Special Anthropological Operation’: How Ideology is Infiltrating Russian Education
August 7, 2024
Andrei Kolesnikov
Member of the Scientific Advisory Council of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Political scientist Andrei Kolesnikov explores the various methods of indoctrination being used by the Kremlin at Russian schools and universities, as well as its attempts to impose ideological restrictions on book publishing and lending.
The first action taken by Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 8, the day after his fifth inauguration, was to sign a decree approving the Fundamentals of State Policy in Historical Education. The decree entails a consolidated instructional methodology in “historical education” across all levels, from kindergarten to secondary education, and, of course, a “unified state line of history textbooks.”
Young people are a most important target for state indoctrination, not least because support for Putin and his initiatives is lowest in this age group.
Higher education under assault
Recently, the regime has started actively working with college and high school students. Many ultraconservative and militarist ideologists even think that the course introduced at universities in the autumn of 2023, Foundations of Russian Statehood, as well as the unified history textbooks published for the upper grades of secondary school for the 2023-24 school year, is insufficient to convert students to the state ideology.
In the view of Alexander Dugin, the ultraconservative philosopher who was recently picked to lead the Ivan Ilyin Higher Political School at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU): “the overwhelming majority of educational institutions in Russia actually reflect the liberal order of the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, what is necessary is the militarization of education, a sharp shift of the vector – above all in the humanities – that has been established in recent decades under the direct control and at the orders of the West, with which we are at war today.”
In April, Andrei Ilnitsky, then an advisor to the defense minister, said in a lecture to students of Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) that “plans are being hatched on the other side of Russia’s borders to sow chaos; undermine sovereignty; and jeopardize history, traditions, values, convictions and ideology.”
At MIPT, Ilnitsky’s lecture prompted only ironic and perplexed comments, whereas there was mass student opposition to the appointment of Dugin at RGGU.
The response from the university’s rector and Dugin himself was in line with current political mores in Russia: they irritably speculated that the petition had been orchestrated by pro-Ukraine forces, “foreign agents” and supporters of “unfriendly countries” – in short, those in the minority.
Young people are a most important target for state indoctrination, not least because support for Putin and his initiatives is lowest in this age group.
Higher education under assault
Recently, the regime has started actively working with college and high school students. Many ultraconservative and militarist ideologists even think that the course introduced at universities in the autumn of 2023, Foundations of Russian Statehood, as well as the unified history textbooks published for the upper grades of secondary school for the 2023-24 school year, is insufficient to convert students to the state ideology.
In the view of Alexander Dugin, the ultraconservative philosopher who was recently picked to lead the Ivan Ilyin Higher Political School at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU): “the overwhelming majority of educational institutions in Russia actually reflect the liberal order of the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, what is necessary is the militarization of education, a sharp shift of the vector – above all in the humanities – that has been established in recent decades under the direct control and at the orders of the West, with which we are at war today.”
In April, Andrei Ilnitsky, then an advisor to the defense minister, said in a lecture to students of Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) that “plans are being hatched on the other side of Russia’s borders to sow chaos; undermine sovereignty; and jeopardize history, traditions, values, convictions and ideology.”
At MIPT, Ilnitsky’s lecture prompted only ironic and perplexed comments, whereas there was mass student opposition to the appointment of Dugin at RGGU.
The response from the university’s rector and Dugin himself was in line with current political mores in Russia: they irritably speculated that the petition had been orchestrated by pro-Ukraine forces, “foreign agents” and supporters of “unfriendly countries” – in short, those in the minority.
“The regime’s propagandists try hard to make it look as if Russian society is united in support of Putin and his war, with the dissenters presented as a tiny minority of outcasts, the only sensible strategy for whom can be to join the majority.”
Young Army members. The organization is supported and funded by the Russian government through the Ministry of Defense. It was established in October 2015 with a mission to train future personnel for the armed services. Source: Wiki Commons
April saw another example of political and ideological control: the administration at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) disbanded the university’s student council because it refused to admit a representative of a pro-Kremlin youth organization, Movement of the First.
Youth movements and what they promote
The current ideological practices in Russia are not – or not yet – totalitarian, though. For now, the regime has been unable to incorporate all young people into its youth movements, including Movement of the First, Young Army and student clubs called I’m Proud.
Young Army was launched two years after the annexation of Crimea, when the regime had already begun its transformation from pure authoritarianism to semi-totalitarianism.
The organization’s mission, as stated on its website, is “to cultivate in Young Army members kindness, compassion, conscientiousness, loyalty, dignity and love for their Motherland. Young Army is dedicated to fostering respect for the institution of family, for the memory of ancestors and for elders.”
The Movement of the First was established in 2022. Though it is meant to recall the Soviet-era Pioneers, the age range is much wider: from six to 25, compared with nine to 14 for the Pioneers.
Movement of the First appeals to a glorious history built on a negative identity, hinting at an enemy that undermines Russia’s self-perception of a unique historical path: “members of the Movement study, know, and protect [author’s italics] the history of Russia, oppose any attempts to distort and denigrate it. They preserve the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland.”
Family values that are “uniquely” traditional represent a crucial aspect of self-identification: “members of the Movement share traditional family values. They are proud of the Russian culture of fatherhood and motherhood. They honor large families. They help younger children, take care of grandparents in the family.”
Youth movements and what they promote
The current ideological practices in Russia are not – or not yet – totalitarian, though. For now, the regime has been unable to incorporate all young people into its youth movements, including Movement of the First, Young Army and student clubs called I’m Proud.
Young Army was launched two years after the annexation of Crimea, when the regime had already begun its transformation from pure authoritarianism to semi-totalitarianism.
The organization’s mission, as stated on its website, is “to cultivate in Young Army members kindness, compassion, conscientiousness, loyalty, dignity and love for their Motherland. Young Army is dedicated to fostering respect for the institution of family, for the memory of ancestors and for elders.”
The Movement of the First was established in 2022. Though it is meant to recall the Soviet-era Pioneers, the age range is much wider: from six to 25, compared with nine to 14 for the Pioneers.
Movement of the First appeals to a glorious history built on a negative identity, hinting at an enemy that undermines Russia’s self-perception of a unique historical path: “members of the Movement study, know, and protect [author’s italics] the history of Russia, oppose any attempts to distort and denigrate it. They preserve the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland.”
Family values that are “uniquely” traditional represent a crucial aspect of self-identification: “members of the Movement share traditional family values. They are proud of the Russian culture of fatherhood and motherhood. They honor large families. They help younger children, take care of grandparents in the family.”
One of the "Conversations about Important Things" is a "lesson in gratitude" by Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov). Match 2023. Source: VK
Ceremonies and rituals at schools
Indoctrination at the school level includes unified history textbooks and mandatory “Conversations about Important Things” as the first class on Mondays.
For example, the lesson on “Crimea and Sevastopol: Ten Years in Their Native Harbor” is given by Metropolitan Tikhon Shevkunov, a prominent figure in the Russian Orthodox Church whose book Death of an Empire has become yet another ideological weapon for the regime.
Additionally, the state ideology is cemented by ceremonies (in particular, the raising of the flag in schools) and rituals. For example, as part of the Letter to a Soldier initiative, designed to create the impression of continuity from World War II to the “special military operation,” students are supposed to congratulate Russian soldiers in Ukraine on the occasion of the May 9 Victory Day holiday.
Indoctrination at the school level includes unified history textbooks and mandatory “Conversations about Important Things” as the first class on Mondays.
For example, the lesson on “Crimea and Sevastopol: Ten Years in Their Native Harbor” is given by Metropolitan Tikhon Shevkunov, a prominent figure in the Russian Orthodox Church whose book Death of an Empire has become yet another ideological weapon for the regime.
Additionally, the state ideology is cemented by ceremonies (in particular, the raising of the flag in schools) and rituals. For example, as part of the Letter to a Soldier initiative, designed to create the impression of continuity from World War II to the “special military operation,” students are supposed to congratulate Russian soldiers in Ukraine on the occasion of the May 9 Victory Day holiday.
“There is also a mandatory (or at least strongly encouraged) campaign at educational institutions throughout the country to donate supplies for the war.”
In the spring of 2024, for example, Dagestan’s education minister, Yahya Buchaev, instructed schools to teach students to weave camouflage nets and make trench candles as part of their extracurricular programs.
School curriculum changes
There have also been changes in school curricula. Some books that had been integral to shaping the identity of Soviet citizens, such as Alexander Fadeyev’s The Young Guard and Nikolai Ostrovsky’s How the Steel Was Tempered, have been brought back and included in today’s eleventh-grade curriculum.
Metropolitan Tikhon’s aforementioned Death of an Empire has also made it onto the list of recommended literature. Some anti-Soviet (and primarily anti-Stalinist) books are still on the reading list, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago and One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, though others have been struck from it, like Georgy Vladimov’s Faithful Ruslan, Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales and Yuri Trifonov’s The House on the Embankment (see here and here).
Literature as history is becoming an instrument of indoctrination in school. Under an April 2024 decree from the Education Ministry, the number of classroom hours allocated for teaching history was increased significantly. Naturally, a lot still depends on the individual teacher, as was also the case in the Soviet Union. However, the system itself is putting pressure on teachers, even the best of whom are being forced to adapt to the political circumstances – along with, of course, the students.
The same Education Ministry decree has drastically reduced the number of classroom hours for social studies – in grades six through eight, the subject was simply eliminated. Perhaps this is because the sociopolitical reality directly contradicts the democratic, constitutional foundations of the modern Russian state, as well as the constitutionally protected rights and freedoms of its citizens.
Yana Lantratova, a Duma deputy, explained the changes in the social studies curriculum as follows: “if you look at the concepts being studied in this period, these are primarily Western concepts, which say that a society that respects religion, large families and traditional values is a backward society, and that the only ideal model is the American model.”
School curriculum changes
There have also been changes in school curricula. Some books that had been integral to shaping the identity of Soviet citizens, such as Alexander Fadeyev’s The Young Guard and Nikolai Ostrovsky’s How the Steel Was Tempered, have been brought back and included in today’s eleventh-grade curriculum.
Metropolitan Tikhon’s aforementioned Death of an Empire has also made it onto the list of recommended literature. Some anti-Soviet (and primarily anti-Stalinist) books are still on the reading list, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago and One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, though others have been struck from it, like Georgy Vladimov’s Faithful Ruslan, Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales and Yuri Trifonov’s The House on the Embankment (see here and here).
Literature as history is becoming an instrument of indoctrination in school. Under an April 2024 decree from the Education Ministry, the number of classroom hours allocated for teaching history was increased significantly. Naturally, a lot still depends on the individual teacher, as was also the case in the Soviet Union. However, the system itself is putting pressure on teachers, even the best of whom are being forced to adapt to the political circumstances – along with, of course, the students.
The same Education Ministry decree has drastically reduced the number of classroom hours for social studies – in grades six through eight, the subject was simply eliminated. Perhaps this is because the sociopolitical reality directly contradicts the democratic, constitutional foundations of the modern Russian state, as well as the constitutionally protected rights and freedoms of its citizens.
Yana Lantratova, a Duma deputy, explained the changes in the social studies curriculum as follows: “if you look at the concepts being studied in this period, these are primarily Western concepts, which say that a society that respects religion, large families and traditional values is a backward society, and that the only ideal model is the American model.”
Roberto Carnero’s biography of the gay Italian filmmaker Pier Paolo Pasolini, which hit bookshelves and online stores in May 2024, is physically redacted, with fragments related to Pasolini’s sexuality blacked out. Source: VK
Disappearing pages
The book market reflects the general trend toward intellectual violence. In the mass market, an “expert center” has been established to assess whether print and electronic editions correspond to laws and norms, above all those prohibiting “LGBTQ propaganda.” This de facto censorship agency encourages denunciations and complements the efforts of law enforcement. Unlike Soviet times, this is not preventive censorship, but rather retroactive inspections of and bans on already-published books, sometimes through warnings by the prosecutor’s office (see Russia.Post about it here).
In a telling initiative, Duma deputies suggested an amendment to the law on libraries that would prohibit the lending of books authored by “foreign agents,” “terrorists” and “extremists.” In fact, many libraries and bookstores have already stopped lending out and selling “foreign agent” books in the spirit of preventive conformism. Some publishing houses have also stopped signing contracts with authors who have been declared “foreign agents,” fearing that they might have difficulty selling their books or might get in trouble themselves.
‘Special anthropological operation’
Intellectual violence and spiritual oppression are becoming a routine part of everyday life. Though Russians can still try to ignore this, the state is increasingly saturating everyday life with propaganda and ideology. For example, St Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov has promised to rename the city’s schools en masse after participants of the “special military operation.”
The book market reflects the general trend toward intellectual violence. In the mass market, an “expert center” has been established to assess whether print and electronic editions correspond to laws and norms, above all those prohibiting “LGBTQ propaganda.” This de facto censorship agency encourages denunciations and complements the efforts of law enforcement. Unlike Soviet times, this is not preventive censorship, but rather retroactive inspections of and bans on already-published books, sometimes through warnings by the prosecutor’s office (see Russia.Post about it here).
In a telling initiative, Duma deputies suggested an amendment to the law on libraries that would prohibit the lending of books authored by “foreign agents,” “terrorists” and “extremists.” In fact, many libraries and bookstores have already stopped lending out and selling “foreign agent” books in the spirit of preventive conformism. Some publishing houses have also stopped signing contracts with authors who have been declared “foreign agents,” fearing that they might have difficulty selling their books or might get in trouble themselves.
‘Special anthropological operation’
Intellectual violence and spiritual oppression are becoming a routine part of everyday life. Though Russians can still try to ignore this, the state is increasingly saturating everyday life with propaganda and ideology. For example, St Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov has promised to rename the city’s schools en masse after participants of the “special military operation.”
“With Putin’s leadership having lasted for almost a quarter century, his regime seems all but eternal, and many Russians currently coming of age find it natural to make use of the career elevators offered by the state.”
To do this, they need to demonstrate political loyalty, adherence to “traditional values” and a “patriotic” consciousness (in other words, a focus on defending Russia from its supposed enemies).
The current nationalization of the individual (as well as his property) is a work in progress. It is an escalating “special anthropological operation” in which intellectual violence has enormous practical significance.
The state will not stop and be content what it has achieved so far; however, Russian society too will continue to fight to protect human dignity. This will be a protracted war of attrition, and the outcome is unpredictable.
The current nationalization of the individual (as well as his property) is a work in progress. It is an escalating “special anthropological operation” in which intellectual violence has enormous practical significance.
The state will not stop and be content what it has achieved so far; however, Russian society too will continue to fight to protect human dignity. This will be a protracted war of attrition, and the outcome is unpredictable.
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