SOCIETY
Most Russians Want Peace, But They Think the Kremlin Knows Best
June 13, 2025
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Denis Volkov
Director of the Levada Center (Moscow)
Levada Center head Denis Volkov argues that when the government stresses the need for dialogue with Kyiv, public support for negotiations rises, but when official interest disappears, public support falls.
The original text in Russian was published in Forbes and is being republished here with small changes and their permission.
A shot from an FPV drone hitting a Russian bomber at Russia's Olenya air base (Kola Peninsula) during Ukraine’s Operation Spider's Web. June 1. Source: Wiki Commons
In mid-May, when the first direct Russia-Ukraine negotiations in a long time took place in Istanbul, it began to seem that the sides, under persistent pressure from the US, were beginning to move toward a settlement. In May, the share of Russians in favor of negotiations with Ukraine reached its highest level since 2022.
Yet Ukraine’s Spider’s Web operation, where it attacked Russian airfields with drones, on the eve of the second meeting in Istanbul, along with the promise of retaliation by Russia, shows that hopes for a quick end to the conflict are likely unfounded. How are Russians reacting to this?
Public opinion about the conflict
To answer this question, let’s look at the latest public opinion polls on attitudes toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Throughout the conflict, support for the Russian army’s campaign in Ukraine has remained high: at end-May it was 80% of respondents, with 47 percentage points being strong, unconditional support and another 33 percentage points being support with various reservations.
These steady numbers are attributable primarily to general support for “our boys” rather than assessments of specific events – as respondents often say, “who else should we support?” It is unlikely that recent events will change anything in this regard.
Yet Ukraine’s Spider’s Web operation, where it attacked Russian airfields with drones, on the eve of the second meeting in Istanbul, along with the promise of retaliation by Russia, shows that hopes for a quick end to the conflict are likely unfounded. How are Russians reacting to this?
Public opinion about the conflict
To answer this question, let’s look at the latest public opinion polls on attitudes toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Throughout the conflict, support for the Russian army’s campaign in Ukraine has remained high: at end-May it was 80% of respondents, with 47 percentage points being strong, unconditional support and another 33 percentage points being support with various reservations.
These steady numbers are attributable primarily to general support for “our boys” rather than assessments of specific events – as respondents often say, “who else should we support?” It is unlikely that recent events will change anything in this regard.
“Open opposition to the Kremlin remains low: since February 2022, it has fluctuated in a range of 15-20% in surveys.”
What five countries do you think are the most unfriendly/hostile toward Russia? (light blue: US; dark blue: UK; dark red: Germany; yellow: Ukraine; light red: Poland) Levada Center. June 5.
In the national media, opposition is often equated with treason, which has led to a gradual increase in public condemnation and rejection of dissent.
The latest surveys on the potential for protests show stiffening attitudes toward antiwar demonstrations in Russian society: whereas in mid-2022 almost 60% of respondents said that such demonstrations should not be restricted, by April of this year this percentage had shrunk to 45%.
Meanwhile, support for negotiations with Ukraine has increased significantly over the past year. Whereas in May of last year half of the population were in favor of talks, today it is 64% – the highest number since the conflict started. This has been accompanied by a decrease in support for continuing the “special military operation” from 41% to a low of 28% over the same period.
This shift has been fairly smooth and steady, briefly disrupted only by the Ukrainian army’s foray into Kursk Region in August, though as soon as September the trend of rising support for negotiations resumed.
There are several reasons for this, including psychological fatigue from the ongoing bloodshed – at least this is the explanation given to the open question of why starting negotiations is needed.
The latest surveys on the potential for protests show stiffening attitudes toward antiwar demonstrations in Russian society: whereas in mid-2022 almost 60% of respondents said that such demonstrations should not be restricted, by April of this year this percentage had shrunk to 45%.
Meanwhile, support for negotiations with Ukraine has increased significantly over the past year. Whereas in May of last year half of the population were in favor of talks, today it is 64% – the highest number since the conflict started. This has been accompanied by a decrease in support for continuing the “special military operation” from 41% to a low of 28% over the same period.
This shift has been fairly smooth and steady, briefly disrupted only by the Ukrainian army’s foray into Kursk Region in August, though as soon as September the trend of rising support for negotiations resumed.
There are several reasons for this, including psychological fatigue from the ongoing bloodshed – at least this is the explanation given to the open question of why starting negotiations is needed.
“Fatigue, combined with the underlying concern that further escalation may require new mobilization, is the average Russian’s main fear surrounding the conflict.”
These sentiments are strongly influenced by the public position of the Russian government: when the talk of negotiations disappears, as was the case in late 2023/early 2024 ahead of the presidential election, public support for negotiations falls; but when the authorities themselves emphasize the need for dialogue with Kyiv, public support for negotiations rises.
Despite the general desire for a ceasefire, the majority of Russians believe the decision of peace or war should be made by the government – the reasoning goes that the country’s leaders know better, and all “us little people” can do is wait for everything to be “sorted out” and “settle down.”
Our research also finds that when there is no need to choose between negotiations and an end to the fighting, public support for negotiations is even higher. This is reflected in the positive view of the US-Russia talks in Riyadh (85% of Russians approved of them) and the first Russia-Ukraine meeting in Istanbul in May (87%).
This finding is further confirmed by the 73% support for the Russian position in negotiations of first eliminating the “root causes” of the conflict and only then calling a ceasefire. In focus groups, supporters of continuing the “special operation” are often not against negotiations in principle, because they think it necessary to “convey your point of view,” “explain your position,” “keep communication channels open,” even while continuing the offensive.
At the same time, it is believed that the Russian side is most interested in peace negotiations.
Despite the general desire for a ceasefire, the majority of Russians believe the decision of peace or war should be made by the government – the reasoning goes that the country’s leaders know better, and all “us little people” can do is wait for everything to be “sorted out” and “settle down.”
Our research also finds that when there is no need to choose between negotiations and an end to the fighting, public support for negotiations is even higher. This is reflected in the positive view of the US-Russia talks in Riyadh (85% of Russians approved of them) and the first Russia-Ukraine meeting in Istanbul in May (87%).
This finding is further confirmed by the 73% support for the Russian position in negotiations of first eliminating the “root causes” of the conflict and only then calling a ceasefire. In focus groups, supporters of continuing the “special operation” are often not against negotiations in principle, because they think it necessary to “convey your point of view,” “explain your position,” “keep communication channels open,” even while continuing the offensive.
At the same time, it is believed that the Russian side is most interested in peace negotiations.
“The majority of respondents tend to blame Ukraine and Europe for the fact that the conflict has not been settled.”
Do you think Russia should improve relations with the US and other Western countries? (dark blue: definitely yes/probably yes; red: definitely no/probably no; gray: hard to say) Levada Center. June 5
The US has recently found itself left out of this equation, even though until recently it was the US that was seen as the main driver of the war.
The US no longer the main enemy
The first signs of a change in sentiment appeared in late 2024/early 2025, after Trump’s election and return to the White House.
His comments about wanting to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict quickly generated interest during the race and laid the foundation for a positive attitude of Russians toward Trump after the election. In many ways, this was facilitated by the attention given to him by the Russian media, which cover every new statement by the US president.
Recently, however, our respondents have begun to tire of Trump: “he talks a lot, but nothing happens,” “he only thinks about making money,” “he does not know what he wants.”
That said, Trump’s actions have already led to noticeable shifts in Russians’ worldview. As early as February, the share of those who positively viewed the US had grown to 30%, twice the figure in September.
In the following months, the warming toward the US continued, though at a more moderate pace: at end-May, 37% of Russians said they have a positive view of the US, while 47% reported a negative view.
The US no longer the main enemy
The first signs of a change in sentiment appeared in late 2024/early 2025, after Trump’s election and return to the White House.
His comments about wanting to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict quickly generated interest during the race and laid the foundation for a positive attitude of Russians toward Trump after the election. In many ways, this was facilitated by the attention given to him by the Russian media, which cover every new statement by the US president.
Recently, however, our respondents have begun to tire of Trump: “he talks a lot, but nothing happens,” “he only thinks about making money,” “he does not know what he wants.”
That said, Trump’s actions have already led to noticeable shifts in Russians’ worldview. As early as February, the share of those who positively viewed the US had grown to 30%, twice the figure in September.
In the following months, the warming toward the US continued, though at a more moderate pace: at end-May, 37% of Russians said they have a positive view of the US, while 47% reported a negative view.
“For the first time in 20 years of polling, Russians now have a worse attitude toward Europe than toward the US.”
All these years, Europe was perceived as the little brother of the US, unquestioningly following Washington’s orders.
In 2025, the situation changed: in February, the US had a 9 percentage-point lead over the EU in terms of favorability, which had extended in May to 16 percentage points. In addition, for the first time the US ceased to be perceived by public opinion as the most unfriendly country to Russia, surpassed by Ukraine, Poland, Germany and the UK – which came amid talk of possible supplies of long-range missiles to Kyiv.
The improved attitudes toward the US have led to a perceived reduction in Russia-NATO tensions: a direct conflict seems less likely to our respondents than it did two years ago.
The number of Russians who support further détente and normalization of relations between Russia and the West has returned to the 80% level observed before 2022. Today, such normalization, at least in relations with the US, no longer seems implausible to Russians, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict and US-Russia relations are increasingly separated in Russian public opinion.
In 2025, the situation changed: in February, the US had a 9 percentage-point lead over the EU in terms of favorability, which had extended in May to 16 percentage points. In addition, for the first time the US ceased to be perceived by public opinion as the most unfriendly country to Russia, surpassed by Ukraine, Poland, Germany and the UK – which came amid talk of possible supplies of long-range missiles to Kyiv.
The improved attitudes toward the US have led to a perceived reduction in Russia-NATO tensions: a direct conflict seems less likely to our respondents than it did two years ago.
The number of Russians who support further détente and normalization of relations between Russia and the West has returned to the 80% level observed before 2022. Today, such normalization, at least in relations with the US, no longer seems implausible to Russians, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict and US-Russia relations are increasingly separated in Russian public opinion.
Do you think the prevailing mood today among your relatives, friends, colleagues and acquaintances is characterized by calm or anxiety? (green: calm; red: anxiety; gray: hard to say). Source: FOM
Public opinion about the economy
The resilience of the Russian economy, in the face of Western sanctions, has played an important role in pushing the “special operation” rather quickly to the periphery of public attention, as after the anxiety of the first months of the conflict, Russians saw it was possible to continue living a more or less normal life.
During the first two years of the conflict, up to spring 2024, mass assessments of the economic situation steadily improved, to the point that a year ago, by most indicators, the economy was perceived as better than early 2008, the height of the era of “stability.” The crisis that followed reduced confidence in the economy for a long time, and it took more than 15 years for it to build back up.
However, shortly after the 2024 presidential election, the perception of the economic situation began to deteriorate. This decline continued for more than six months, until end-2024. A longer and deeper deterioration in economic assessments could eventually affect Russians’ position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict: when the average person sees his economic well-being improving, he is not overly concerned with the government’s policies, and it is much more difficult to sell the population on “guns over butter.”
But so far in 2025, economic assessments have bounced back. By end-May, more Russians were upbeat on their family’s financial situation than downbeat on it. As for their family’s economic situation in a year and the outlook for the economy as a whole, Russians were overwhelmingly optimistic, with optimistic responses outnumbering pessimistic responses four to one.
By most indicators, Russians are again as satisfied with the economy as before the 2008 crisis and, considering their expectations, are even more satisfied.
Similarly, respondents’ aggregate assessments of their own economic situation, based on average data for the first five months of 2025, continue to improve.
The share of indigent people in our survey (those who said they barely have enough money for food or clothes) has decreased to 15%, while the share of well-off people (those who said they can easily afford durable goods or really expensive things) has increased to 41%.
The resilience of the Russian economy, in the face of Western sanctions, has played an important role in pushing the “special operation” rather quickly to the periphery of public attention, as after the anxiety of the first months of the conflict, Russians saw it was possible to continue living a more or less normal life.
During the first two years of the conflict, up to spring 2024, mass assessments of the economic situation steadily improved, to the point that a year ago, by most indicators, the economy was perceived as better than early 2008, the height of the era of “stability.” The crisis that followed reduced confidence in the economy for a long time, and it took more than 15 years for it to build back up.
However, shortly after the 2024 presidential election, the perception of the economic situation began to deteriorate. This decline continued for more than six months, until end-2024. A longer and deeper deterioration in economic assessments could eventually affect Russians’ position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict: when the average person sees his economic well-being improving, he is not overly concerned with the government’s policies, and it is much more difficult to sell the population on “guns over butter.”
But so far in 2025, economic assessments have bounced back. By end-May, more Russians were upbeat on their family’s financial situation than downbeat on it. As for their family’s economic situation in a year and the outlook for the economy as a whole, Russians were overwhelmingly optimistic, with optimistic responses outnumbering pessimistic responses four to one.
By most indicators, Russians are again as satisfied with the economy as before the 2008 crisis and, considering their expectations, are even more satisfied.
Similarly, respondents’ aggregate assessments of their own economic situation, based on average data for the first five months of 2025, continue to improve.
The share of indigent people in our survey (those who said they barely have enough money for food or clothes) has decreased to 15%, while the share of well-off people (those who said they can easily afford durable goods or really expensive things) has increased to 41%.
“The stability and moderate satisfaction of respondents with the state of the economy means Russian society will remain relatively indifferent to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.”
What might change
Let’s return to the question asked at the beginning of this piece about the impact of the current turn toward escalation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict on public opinion. Our analysis suggests that significant shifts in public opinion should not be expected. Over the course of these almost three and a half years, key indicators of sentiment have changed little.
Currently, anxiety in Russian society is decreasing thanks to what is seen as a relatively healthy economic situation, along with easing tensions with the West (amid some normalization of relations with the US). Looking ahead, the mood will largely depend on what position Trump takes on Russia in the future.
If a negative scenario plays out, with, say, a breakdown of negotiations with Kyiv and a stalled rapprochement with Washington, then, by analogy with the situation after the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Region last year, we might expect a decrease in support for a negotiated resolution of the conflict.
Nevertheless, the effect is unlikely to be sharp or long term. In many ways, the depth of the decrease in support for negotiations would be determined by the rhetoric of the Russian authorities: were it not to change, the shift in public opinion would be minimal. Most Russians have long wanted peace, but they think the government should ultimately decide whether to make peace and when. And this position is unlikely to change anytime soon.
Let’s return to the question asked at the beginning of this piece about the impact of the current turn toward escalation in the Russia-Ukraine conflict on public opinion. Our analysis suggests that significant shifts in public opinion should not be expected. Over the course of these almost three and a half years, key indicators of sentiment have changed little.
Currently, anxiety in Russian society is decreasing thanks to what is seen as a relatively healthy economic situation, along with easing tensions with the West (amid some normalization of relations with the US). Looking ahead, the mood will largely depend on what position Trump takes on Russia in the future.
If a negative scenario plays out, with, say, a breakdown of negotiations with Kyiv and a stalled rapprochement with Washington, then, by analogy with the situation after the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Region last year, we might expect a decrease in support for a negotiated resolution of the conflict.
Nevertheless, the effect is unlikely to be sharp or long term. In many ways, the depth of the decrease in support for negotiations would be determined by the rhetoric of the Russian authorities: were it not to change, the shift in public opinion would be minimal. Most Russians have long wanted peace, but they think the government should ultimately decide whether to make peace and when. And this position is unlikely to change anytime soon.
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