Politics
Has the Trump US-Russia Reset Run Its Course?
February 25, 2026
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Maria Snegovaya
Political scientist
The elites in Russia and the US have fundamentally different worldviews. Donald Trump’s approach toward peacemaking as a transactional deal seems unreconcilable with the ideological and revanchist nature of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine and the West, political scientist Maria Snegovaya argues.
This is a shortened and translated version of an article originally published by Republic.
Trump spent a year courting the Kremlin, cozying up to Putin while pressuring and continuing to pressure Zelensky. The phrase “the spirit of Anchorage” has even emerged, and negotiations have continued. In short, US strategy toward Russia has shifted over the past year. How would you assess the results, if there are any?
We are witnessing a return to an era of great power rivalry – a foreign policy built less on normative rules and more on the pursuit of tangible outcomes through carrots and sticks. Trump constantly stresses that moral considerations are secondary for him. In Davos recently, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney well summarized these trends.
As for Russia, we are seeing the continuation of dynamics that partly emerged during Trump’s first term. This is not his first unsuccessful attempt to reach an understanding with Putin. Moreover, Trump is not unique in this – every US administration over the past 20 years has tried to reset relations with Russia. Even the Biden administration in 2021 sought to “put on ice” (priparkovat’) the relationship with Russia – that is, to stabilize and de-escalate relations.
Putin has batted away these attempts every time. This is clearly evident in the failure of peace talks. At present, the US appears to be attempting for roughly the seventh time this year to relaunch talks between Ukraine and Russia. Yet the sides are approaching negotiations with entirely different understandings of their interests and objectives, and Russia remains committed to an aggressive course. So no progress has been made.
The US under Trump has ultimately been compelled to harden its stance toward Russia, even if Trump did not want to. By mid-2025, Trump was publicly suggesting that Putin might be trying to stall rather than engage in serious negotiations. He subsequently tightened US policy by imposing steep tariffs on Indian goods in response to India’s purchases of Russian oil (these tariffs are now being lifted amid a sharp reduction in Indian purchases). He then introduced tough sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, which led to a decline in Russian budget revenues.
Thus, it might have started off well, but Washington has in effect returned to roughly where the previous administration left off, albeit in a situation that has proved far more painful for Ukraine, as the US has reduced arms supplies. The dynamic recalls Trump’s first term. Though there was no war at the time, efforts to reset relations ultimately failed and culminated in the delivery of Javelin anti-tank weapons to Ukraine.
Trump spent a year courting the Kremlin, cozying up to Putin while pressuring and continuing to pressure Zelensky. The phrase “the spirit of Anchorage” has even emerged, and negotiations have continued. In short, US strategy toward Russia has shifted over the past year. How would you assess the results, if there are any?
We are witnessing a return to an era of great power rivalry – a foreign policy built less on normative rules and more on the pursuit of tangible outcomes through carrots and sticks. Trump constantly stresses that moral considerations are secondary for him. In Davos recently, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney well summarized these trends.
As for Russia, we are seeing the continuation of dynamics that partly emerged during Trump’s first term. This is not his first unsuccessful attempt to reach an understanding with Putin. Moreover, Trump is not unique in this – every US administration over the past 20 years has tried to reset relations with Russia. Even the Biden administration in 2021 sought to “put on ice” (priparkovat’) the relationship with Russia – that is, to stabilize and de-escalate relations.
Putin has batted away these attempts every time. This is clearly evident in the failure of peace talks. At present, the US appears to be attempting for roughly the seventh time this year to relaunch talks between Ukraine and Russia. Yet the sides are approaching negotiations with entirely different understandings of their interests and objectives, and Russia remains committed to an aggressive course. So no progress has been made.
The US under Trump has ultimately been compelled to harden its stance toward Russia, even if Trump did not want to. By mid-2025, Trump was publicly suggesting that Putin might be trying to stall rather than engage in serious negotiations. He subsequently tightened US policy by imposing steep tariffs on Indian goods in response to India’s purchases of Russian oil (these tariffs are now being lifted amid a sharp reduction in Indian purchases). He then introduced tough sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, which led to a decline in Russian budget revenues.
Thus, it might have started off well, but Washington has in effect returned to roughly where the previous administration left off, albeit in a situation that has proved far more painful for Ukraine, as the US has reduced arms supplies. The dynamic recalls Trump’s first term. Though there was no war at the time, efforts to reset relations ultimately failed and culminated in the delivery of Javelin anti-tank weapons to Ukraine.
Donald J. Trump greets Vladimir Putin during a summit in Alaska, 2025
Alaska National Guard
Alaska National Guard
There appears to be limited scope for reversing this pattern because Trump and Putin define their goals and tasks in fundamentally different ways. For Putin, the war is ideological and revanchist. For Trump, it is approached in transactional terms – give everyone a piece of territory they would like to control. Then things will work themselves out and they will make peace. This case, however, is different.
More broadly, Trump has acted as an accelerant for many processes already underway prior to his return to office. These include a gradual US exit from Europe and a shift toward the Pacific region – this has been a priority since the Obama administration. Putin’s aggressive policy in Europe has repeatedly got in the way of this. In Trump’s second term, however, the rebalancing has clearly accelerated, in part against the backdrop of heightened tensions around Taiwan.
You have a concept that the Cold War is still ongoing, and the White House must understand that they are dealing with virtually the same political class that existed in the USSR. What should be done now, in light of Trump’s current policy?
Though Trump and Putin are roughly the same age, they live in fundamentally different worlds. Trump thinks in terms of deals: let’s make peace, trade and grow richer. Apparently, he has certain contacts with members of the Russian elite, and new materials in the Epstein case shed additional light on this. Hence his conviction that it is always possible to reach an agreement with these people. It is no coincidence that Steve Witkoff, who previously handled real estate deals in Trump’s circle, is now involved in negotiations with the Kremlin on Ukraine.
But the Kremlin sees the world completely differently. In many ways, it is representatives of the Soviet elite, the second- and third-tier nomenklatura, who have remained at the helm of post-Soviet Russia. These people are shaped by a particular value system and worldview. Toward the end of the Soviet Union, few of them seriously believed in Marxism. But they retained the belief that the West is the enemy. Most importantly, in their worldview, military power is decisive, especially in politics. Talk of values, of countries just living peacefully and trading with one another, is seen as a scam. In reality, the world is dangerous and cruel, and the strongest prevails. Russia, in this logic, is a great power with a “special path.” Its greatness is conditioned on influence over neighboring countries and control over their foreign policy. Moreover, from this perspective, Russia should have veto power on key issues of European security.
For these groups in the Kremlin, the collapse of the USSR was an utterly terrible catastrophe. It happened due to Gorbachev’s accidental mistakes, not deliberately. In other words, it was a kind of “democracy by mistake,” in Daniel Treisman’s formulation. But to the Kremlin things look completely different. From its perspective, the West took advantage of Russia’s weakness and took away parts of its rightful spheres of influence in Europe. And worst of all, it began to encroach on something it considers sacred – Ukraine.
In the 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has regained some of its former strength thanks to favorable oil prices. It has thus sought to reclaim part of what, from the Kremlin’s perspective, rightfully belongs to Russia. That is precisely how the situation in Ukraine should be understood. This is not a war where control and management of a specific territory are the key factors. It is completely different, for example, from the Israel-Gaza conflict. Trump’s perception of these conflicts as similar in nature is mistaken. Russia is waging an ideological and revanchist war. The Kremlin is not so much concerned with how much Ukrainian territory it takes. What is crucial is that the countries around Russia, those within what it sees as Russia’s sphere of influence, are not allowed to decide independently which international alliances to join and are deprived of full sovereignty over their foreign policies. And if they try, they will be harshly punished, as Ukraine was.
Furthermore, the Kremlin is demanding a revision of the entire European security architecture as it emerged after the Cold War. As we recall, before the 2022 attack on Ukraine, it demanded that NATO return to its 1997 borders and so on. All of this did not begin with Putin – it has been going on since Yeltsin’s time. The Kremlin firmly believes that the West has taken from Russia what is rightfully Russia’s. And it will not stop until it either gets what it wants or runs out of resources. Western policy, thus, should be aimed at exhausting the Kremlin’s resources as quickly as possible.
Note that historically Ukraine is a site of centuries-long clashes between Western and Russian influence. This civilizational fault line runs through Ukraine. Its unique location and history have, unfortunately, made it a site of a “clash of civilizations.”
In many ways, we have indeed returned to the context of the Cold War, only in a tenser form, with a weakened yet simultaneously more aggressive Russia. This confrontation could last a very long time. Again: for the Kremlin, it is ideological. It is more complicated than simply taking another piece of territory.
More broadly, Trump has acted as an accelerant for many processes already underway prior to his return to office. These include a gradual US exit from Europe and a shift toward the Pacific region – this has been a priority since the Obama administration. Putin’s aggressive policy in Europe has repeatedly got in the way of this. In Trump’s second term, however, the rebalancing has clearly accelerated, in part against the backdrop of heightened tensions around Taiwan.
You have a concept that the Cold War is still ongoing, and the White House must understand that they are dealing with virtually the same political class that existed in the USSR. What should be done now, in light of Trump’s current policy?
Though Trump and Putin are roughly the same age, they live in fundamentally different worlds. Trump thinks in terms of deals: let’s make peace, trade and grow richer. Apparently, he has certain contacts with members of the Russian elite, and new materials in the Epstein case shed additional light on this. Hence his conviction that it is always possible to reach an agreement with these people. It is no coincidence that Steve Witkoff, who previously handled real estate deals in Trump’s circle, is now involved in negotiations with the Kremlin on Ukraine.
But the Kremlin sees the world completely differently. In many ways, it is representatives of the Soviet elite, the second- and third-tier nomenklatura, who have remained at the helm of post-Soviet Russia. These people are shaped by a particular value system and worldview. Toward the end of the Soviet Union, few of them seriously believed in Marxism. But they retained the belief that the West is the enemy. Most importantly, in their worldview, military power is decisive, especially in politics. Talk of values, of countries just living peacefully and trading with one another, is seen as a scam. In reality, the world is dangerous and cruel, and the strongest prevails. Russia, in this logic, is a great power with a “special path.” Its greatness is conditioned on influence over neighboring countries and control over their foreign policy. Moreover, from this perspective, Russia should have veto power on key issues of European security.
For these groups in the Kremlin, the collapse of the USSR was an utterly terrible catastrophe. It happened due to Gorbachev’s accidental mistakes, not deliberately. In other words, it was a kind of “democracy by mistake,” in Daniel Treisman’s formulation. But to the Kremlin things look completely different. From its perspective, the West took advantage of Russia’s weakness and took away parts of its rightful spheres of influence in Europe. And worst of all, it began to encroach on something it considers sacred – Ukraine.
In the 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has regained some of its former strength thanks to favorable oil prices. It has thus sought to reclaim part of what, from the Kremlin’s perspective, rightfully belongs to Russia. That is precisely how the situation in Ukraine should be understood. This is not a war where control and management of a specific territory are the key factors. It is completely different, for example, from the Israel-Gaza conflict. Trump’s perception of these conflicts as similar in nature is mistaken. Russia is waging an ideological and revanchist war. The Kremlin is not so much concerned with how much Ukrainian territory it takes. What is crucial is that the countries around Russia, those within what it sees as Russia’s sphere of influence, are not allowed to decide independently which international alliances to join and are deprived of full sovereignty over their foreign policies. And if they try, they will be harshly punished, as Ukraine was.
Furthermore, the Kremlin is demanding a revision of the entire European security architecture as it emerged after the Cold War. As we recall, before the 2022 attack on Ukraine, it demanded that NATO return to its 1997 borders and so on. All of this did not begin with Putin – it has been going on since Yeltsin’s time. The Kremlin firmly believes that the West has taken from Russia what is rightfully Russia’s. And it will not stop until it either gets what it wants or runs out of resources. Western policy, thus, should be aimed at exhausting the Kremlin’s resources as quickly as possible.
Note that historically Ukraine is a site of centuries-long clashes between Western and Russian influence. This civilizational fault line runs through Ukraine. Its unique location and history have, unfortunately, made it a site of a “clash of civilizations.”
In many ways, we have indeed returned to the context of the Cold War, only in a tenser form, with a weakened yet simultaneously more aggressive Russia. This confrontation could last a very long time. Again: for the Kremlin, it is ideological. It is more complicated than simply taking another piece of territory.
Marek Studzinski / Unsplash
What are your expectations for the Kremlin’s internal policy? This year will obviously be a difficult one for the Russian economy; people are more concerned with their own pocketbook, and many are tired of the war. Could such sentiment impact the Kremlin’s policy, including foreign policy?
As I have already said, the Kremlin launched the war for ideological and revanchist reasons, deciding that the opportune moment had presented itself, the West had weakened sufficiently and Russia had accumulated enough resources. This was not about, for example, trying to retain power or boost the Kremlin’s ratings.
There is a popular belief that Putin needed a “little victorious war” to strengthen his support. But analysis of the data shows a different picture: Russia typically resorts to military force when it has the necessary resources and when the domestic situation is relatively stable. On the contrary, during periods of weakened central authority (vlast’) and growing public discontent, Moscow usually avoids wars with neighboring countries. In this sense, war happens amid domestic stability, not crisis.
Meanwhile, Russian society itself has limited influence on the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Other, more significant factors play the decisive role in shaping its military adventures. Russians rarely express open dissatisfaction with the government’s foreign policy actions and more often adapt to the established logic: if the Kremlin starts another war, it means it “has to be done” and “we are just small people.”
For now, the inertial scenario remains the most likely to materialize. The domestic economic situation is deteriorating and unlikely to improve. The peak of growth under “military Keynesianism” has passed, and a hangover has set in. If dissatisfaction arises, the authorities have repression and propaganda at their disposal. These tools will mitigate discontent in what is an atomized society.
The same applies to the elites. The Russian elites are incapable of a coup. Yes, there was the Prigozhin episode, but his case was unique – he possessed military resources, and the situation was entirely unprecedented. Today, the Kremlin elites are largely servants of the state. Alongside a significant share of Soviet elites, or their descendants, who, as I have mentioned above, are reproduced in Russia’s system of power and share many of Putin’s political views, Sergei Kiriyenko has over the past decade been recreating mechanisms of strict elite selection based on the Soviet model. This is a selection of the most loyal, the most spineless people, those without views of their own. As we see, Nabiullina and Mishustin are actively assisting Putin in his war. They are also additionally threatened with repression. It is not Stalin-style repression – the screws are just being carefully and gradually tightened. But this effectively rules out the possibility of a coup. At present, the most likely scenario remains that Putin will stop ruling when he dies, as was the rule with Russian and Soviet leaders.
Generally, when we speak about a possible elite coup, we assume that Russian elites are somewhat like their Western peers. There is a ruler surrounded by aristocrats and nobles who possess a certain independence and agency. In the Russian case, however, there is the bureaucracy, who are merely implementors of policy, selected above all for their loyalty. They have no political capital of their own and simply carry out orders.
As I have already said, the Kremlin launched the war for ideological and revanchist reasons, deciding that the opportune moment had presented itself, the West had weakened sufficiently and Russia had accumulated enough resources. This was not about, for example, trying to retain power or boost the Kremlin’s ratings.
There is a popular belief that Putin needed a “little victorious war” to strengthen his support. But analysis of the data shows a different picture: Russia typically resorts to military force when it has the necessary resources and when the domestic situation is relatively stable. On the contrary, during periods of weakened central authority (vlast’) and growing public discontent, Moscow usually avoids wars with neighboring countries. In this sense, war happens amid domestic stability, not crisis.
Meanwhile, Russian society itself has limited influence on the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Other, more significant factors play the decisive role in shaping its military adventures. Russians rarely express open dissatisfaction with the government’s foreign policy actions and more often adapt to the established logic: if the Kremlin starts another war, it means it “has to be done” and “we are just small people.”
For now, the inertial scenario remains the most likely to materialize. The domestic economic situation is deteriorating and unlikely to improve. The peak of growth under “military Keynesianism” has passed, and a hangover has set in. If dissatisfaction arises, the authorities have repression and propaganda at their disposal. These tools will mitigate discontent in what is an atomized society.
The same applies to the elites. The Russian elites are incapable of a coup. Yes, there was the Prigozhin episode, but his case was unique – he possessed military resources, and the situation was entirely unprecedented. Today, the Kremlin elites are largely servants of the state. Alongside a significant share of Soviet elites, or their descendants, who, as I have mentioned above, are reproduced in Russia’s system of power and share many of Putin’s political views, Sergei Kiriyenko has over the past decade been recreating mechanisms of strict elite selection based on the Soviet model. This is a selection of the most loyal, the most spineless people, those without views of their own. As we see, Nabiullina and Mishustin are actively assisting Putin in his war. They are also additionally threatened with repression. It is not Stalin-style repression – the screws are just being carefully and gradually tightened. But this effectively rules out the possibility of a coup. At present, the most likely scenario remains that Putin will stop ruling when he dies, as was the rule with Russian and Soviet leaders.
Generally, when we speak about a possible elite coup, we assume that Russian elites are somewhat like their Western peers. There is a ruler surrounded by aristocrats and nobles who possess a certain independence and agency. In the Russian case, however, there is the bureaucracy, who are merely implementors of policy, selected above all for their loyalty. They have no political capital of their own and simply carry out orders.
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