Politics
The Outlook for Peace in the South Caucasus Following the Washington Framework
August 15, 2025
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Jean-François Ratelle
Affiliated researcher and adjunct professor at the University of Ottawa
Political scientist Jean-François Ratelle argues that the trilateral agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia and the US offers hope for peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus. At the same time, in his view, the White House prioritized its own geopolitical and economic interests over a more equitable settlement.
On August 8, Trump signed a trilateral declaration with Aliyev and Pashinyan. Source:: Wiki Commons
In August, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the US concluded a trilateral agreement toward an end to nearly four decades of conflict between the two South Caucasus states. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev endorsed a peace that includes a landmark provision on the Zangezur corridor and a normalization of bilateral relations. It outlines a path to peace and addresses major outstanding issues.
In particular, it entails the creation and management of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport corridor through the Zangezur region. The deal also covers the cessation of all territorial claims, the withdrawal of legal cases from international courts, the dissolution of the Minsk Group and the establishment of a framework for future collaboration in the South Caucasus.
TRIPP
TRIPP creates a 99-year partnership between Armenia and the US that gives the latter exclusive special development rights for the Zangezur corridor in terms of railway, road, communication and energy infrastructure. Operated under Armenian law, the route is supposed to enhance regional connectivity, promote economic collaboration in the South Caucasus and ultimately function as a transit corridor between Asia and Europe that bypasses Russia, its Northern Corridor and Iran.
TRIPP represents the outcome of years of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Following the Russia-brokered ceasefire in November 2020, both sides agreed to secure the movement of people, vehicles and goods in both directions along the Lachin corridor (linking Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Armenia has long promoted its Crossroads of Peace transportation project to establish a corridor in Syunik Province, which it would control and manage under Armenian law. This plan was built on the expectation of reciprocity from Azerbaijan and other regional partners such as Turkey.
In particular, it entails the creation and management of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a transport corridor through the Zangezur region. The deal also covers the cessation of all territorial claims, the withdrawal of legal cases from international courts, the dissolution of the Minsk Group and the establishment of a framework for future collaboration in the South Caucasus.
TRIPP
TRIPP creates a 99-year partnership between Armenia and the US that gives the latter exclusive special development rights for the Zangezur corridor in terms of railway, road, communication and energy infrastructure. Operated under Armenian law, the route is supposed to enhance regional connectivity, promote economic collaboration in the South Caucasus and ultimately function as a transit corridor between Asia and Europe that bypasses Russia, its Northern Corridor and Iran.
TRIPP represents the outcome of years of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Following the Russia-brokered ceasefire in November 2020, both sides agreed to secure the movement of people, vehicles and goods in both directions along the Lachin corridor (linking Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Armenia has long promoted its Crossroads of Peace transportation project to establish a corridor in Syunik Province, which it would control and manage under Armenian law. This plan was built on the expectation of reciprocity from Azerbaijan and other regional partners such as Turkey.
“Armenia, under the provisions of TRIPP, has allowed free and unimpeded movement between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave. Yet it remains to be seen whether and how Azerbaijan will reciprocate.”
Railroad map of the region. The blocked line in south Armenia connects Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. Source: Wiki Commons
This uncertainty is heightened by Azerbaijan’s seizure of the Lachin corridor and the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh in a swift military operation in September 2023, which resulted in the mass exodus of 120,000 Armenians.
Armenia’s hopes for reciprocity largely center on Ankara. By helping to normalize relations with Turkey, this agreement gives Armenia a unique opportunity to participate in the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. The aim is for Armenia to reach the European market and benefit from expanded links with Asia and Europe. Still, this does not mean that Armenia emerges as the main beneficiary of this agreement, which bears the hallmarks of a neocolonial arrangement. While US companies stand to gain significantly from the transit of goods and energy between Asia and Europe, the direct economic benefits for Armenians from the US investment will probably be much more limited.
The Washington framework
The peace accord brokered by the Trump administration built upon a preliminary agreement reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan in March. The Trump administration managed to convince Baku to abandon its preconditions to sign by granting it further concessions, specifically the waiver of Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act, which had previously banned US aid to Azerbaijan following the 2022 and 2023 blockade of the Lachin corridor.
The peace deal brokered by the Trump administration offers tangible gains for Armenia in exchange for relinquishing its claims to Nagorno-Karabakh and its pursuit of international justice. It solidifies Armenia’s pivot toward the West and its geopolitical decoupling from Russia, while also incentivizing the US to actively prevent major military escalations in the South Caucasus. However, it comes without explicit security guarantees for Armenia. Additionally, it effectively limits Azerbaijan’s ability to escalate demands in the peace process.
Armenia has conceded to the majority of Azerbaijan’s demands in diplomatic negotiations since 2020, and now it is ready to waive the right of return for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and the protection of cultural heritage in the region. This is a difficult but acceptable tradeoff for a country that has been isolated and under constant threat from Azerbaijan.
Armenia’s hopes for reciprocity largely center on Ankara. By helping to normalize relations with Turkey, this agreement gives Armenia a unique opportunity to participate in the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. The aim is for Armenia to reach the European market and benefit from expanded links with Asia and Europe. Still, this does not mean that Armenia emerges as the main beneficiary of this agreement, which bears the hallmarks of a neocolonial arrangement. While US companies stand to gain significantly from the transit of goods and energy between Asia and Europe, the direct economic benefits for Armenians from the US investment will probably be much more limited.
The Washington framework
The peace accord brokered by the Trump administration built upon a preliminary agreement reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan in March. The Trump administration managed to convince Baku to abandon its preconditions to sign by granting it further concessions, specifically the waiver of Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act, which had previously banned US aid to Azerbaijan following the 2022 and 2023 blockade of the Lachin corridor.
The peace deal brokered by the Trump administration offers tangible gains for Armenia in exchange for relinquishing its claims to Nagorno-Karabakh and its pursuit of international justice. It solidifies Armenia’s pivot toward the West and its geopolitical decoupling from Russia, while also incentivizing the US to actively prevent major military escalations in the South Caucasus. However, it comes without explicit security guarantees for Armenia. Additionally, it effectively limits Azerbaijan’s ability to escalate demands in the peace process.
Armenia has conceded to the majority of Azerbaijan’s demands in diplomatic negotiations since 2020, and now it is ready to waive the right of return for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and the protection of cultural heritage in the region. This is a difficult but acceptable tradeoff for a country that has been isolated and under constant threat from Azerbaijan.
“Essentially, Armenia has managed to save its sovereignty at the cost of its economic independence and the loss of Karabakh.”
The role of US mediation could be interpreted as an attempt by Washington to capitalize on Armenia’s vulnerability in pursuit of its own interests, rather than a genuine effort to compel good-faith negotiations from Azerbaijan. Ultimately, with the EU remaining a distant and uncommitted partner in the peace process, Armenia likely achieved the most it could under these challenging circumstances.
Geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus
The US-brokered peace deal has significant geopolitical implications, with Turkey and the US emerging as the primary beneficiaries. The agreement allows the US to establish a foothold in the South Caucasus, directly challenging Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Unlike previous engagements in the region, such as in Georgia, which depended on the political regime, this foothold is based on economic incentives created by TRIPP. These incentives encourage cooperation between Baku and Yerevan, which would serve to improve the US position. This pact also represents a major achievement for Turkey’s renewed strategy in the South Caucasus, largely at the expense of its rivals, Russia and Iran.
Russia’s failure to secure a lasting ceasefire with its peacekeeping mission or protect the sovereignty of Armenia, its ally, highlights Moscow’s declining geopolitical fortunes in the South Caucasus. The Washington framework will further marginalize Russia in the region. Recent tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan, including Azerbaijani threats to support Ukraine militarily, combined with Moscow’s political interference in Armenia against the incumbent government, underscore Russia’s diminishing influence and new challenges. While Armenia retains full sovereignty over Syunik Province and reaps the economic benefits of the Washington framework, it will become the epicenter of geopolitical battles between Turkey, Iran and Russia, as well as, to a lesser extent, the US.
The erosion of international law and the US as a mediator
The biggest casualty of this process is largely the rule of law and the victims of the 40-year conflict. Though Trump and Pashinyan briefly discussed the fate of Armenian POWs currently on trial in Azerbaijan, the peace accord is notably silent on the prosecution of war crimes committed during the conflict, the protection of cultural heritage in the South Caucasus, the issue of refugees and the right of return to Nagorno-Karabagh, or more broadly, reconciliation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
This historic peace deal arguably incentivizes Baku’s recent violations of international law, which range from ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity to infringements on Armenia’s sovereignty. The US mediation effort, therefore, may be seen as affirming the erosion of a norm-based international order, in favor of a system driven by power politics and the instrumental use of military force in diplomacy.
Geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus
The US-brokered peace deal has significant geopolitical implications, with Turkey and the US emerging as the primary beneficiaries. The agreement allows the US to establish a foothold in the South Caucasus, directly challenging Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Unlike previous engagements in the region, such as in Georgia, which depended on the political regime, this foothold is based on economic incentives created by TRIPP. These incentives encourage cooperation between Baku and Yerevan, which would serve to improve the US position. This pact also represents a major achievement for Turkey’s renewed strategy in the South Caucasus, largely at the expense of its rivals, Russia and Iran.
Russia’s failure to secure a lasting ceasefire with its peacekeeping mission or protect the sovereignty of Armenia, its ally, highlights Moscow’s declining geopolitical fortunes in the South Caucasus. The Washington framework will further marginalize Russia in the region. Recent tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan, including Azerbaijani threats to support Ukraine militarily, combined with Moscow’s political interference in Armenia against the incumbent government, underscore Russia’s diminishing influence and new challenges. While Armenia retains full sovereignty over Syunik Province and reaps the economic benefits of the Washington framework, it will become the epicenter of geopolitical battles between Turkey, Iran and Russia, as well as, to a lesser extent, the US.
The erosion of international law and the US as a mediator
The biggest casualty of this process is largely the rule of law and the victims of the 40-year conflict. Though Trump and Pashinyan briefly discussed the fate of Armenian POWs currently on trial in Azerbaijan, the peace accord is notably silent on the prosecution of war crimes committed during the conflict, the protection of cultural heritage in the South Caucasus, the issue of refugees and the right of return to Nagorno-Karabagh, or more broadly, reconciliation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
This historic peace deal arguably incentivizes Baku’s recent violations of international law, which range from ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity to infringements on Armenia’s sovereignty. The US mediation effort, therefore, may be seen as affirming the erosion of a norm-based international order, in favor of a system driven by power politics and the instrumental use of military force in diplomacy.
“The outcome of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict legitimizes Azerbaijan’s military aggression and leaves a legacy of unpunished crimes committed by both sides.”
Armen Vardanyan, Russian-Armenian oligarch and former State Minister of Artsakh (November 2022-February 2023), was detained by Azerbaijan in the Lachin corridor after the September 2023 Azerbaijani offensive.
Source: Wiki Commons
Source: Wiki Commons
Without accountability and justice, victims and their families and friends cannot get closure, with the collective trauma persisting as a source of future political instability and manipulation.
This case offers a cautionary precedent for other conflicts, such as Ukraine and Gaza, regarding the role of US interests in peace processes. The White House’s mediation efforts appear to be motivated primarily by geopolitical and domestic political calculations, rather than by a commitment to an equitable settlement. The US government seems prepared to exploit battlefield weaknesses to advance US economic and political interests, rather than acting as an impartial mediator. This self-interested mediation can be seen as predatory and neocolonial and out of line with principles like peace and morality. Earlier, the Trump administration’s decision to cut funding for USAID signaled a shift whereby international development is now fully subordinated to geopolitical strategy, rather than serving as a tool to address global crises.
The real battle for peace in Armenia
The agreement increases Western involvement in the South Caucasus, links US interests to the protection of Armenia’s sovereignty and offers a path to shared prosperity. Its success hinges on acceptance by the local populations and the demobilization of extremist factions that prioritize confrontation over peace. Negotiated between elites and without direct engagement so far by the Armenian or the Azerbaijani population, this agreement has echoes the 1993 Oslo Peace Accord and its implementation challenges.
Significant roadblocks remain before the Armenian population accepts the Washington framework, especially with the 2026 parliamentary election and a likely constitutional referendum on the horizon. While mutually beneficial economic gains can often help reduce ethnic tensions, these benefits, in this case, are overshadowed by the lack of closure for past crimes. The sacrifice of Armenia’s claims with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, its refugees and its cultural heritage, in exchange for the distant prospect of regional prosperity is a difficult concession for both Armenians at home and those in the diaspora, to accept. Many feel they have been forced into a peace deal they loathe – “peace from the barrel of a gun.”
The Washington framework and the coming steps to try to secure the peace will likely deepen the profound political rift in the Armenian political space. This would create conditions highly favorable to Russian political interference in the near future and could further destabilize the position of Pashinyan, whose popular support is already precarious.
This case offers a cautionary precedent for other conflicts, such as Ukraine and Gaza, regarding the role of US interests in peace processes. The White House’s mediation efforts appear to be motivated primarily by geopolitical and domestic political calculations, rather than by a commitment to an equitable settlement. The US government seems prepared to exploit battlefield weaknesses to advance US economic and political interests, rather than acting as an impartial mediator. This self-interested mediation can be seen as predatory and neocolonial and out of line with principles like peace and morality. Earlier, the Trump administration’s decision to cut funding for USAID signaled a shift whereby international development is now fully subordinated to geopolitical strategy, rather than serving as a tool to address global crises.
The real battle for peace in Armenia
The agreement increases Western involvement in the South Caucasus, links US interests to the protection of Armenia’s sovereignty and offers a path to shared prosperity. Its success hinges on acceptance by the local populations and the demobilization of extremist factions that prioritize confrontation over peace. Negotiated between elites and without direct engagement so far by the Armenian or the Azerbaijani population, this agreement has echoes the 1993 Oslo Peace Accord and its implementation challenges.
Significant roadblocks remain before the Armenian population accepts the Washington framework, especially with the 2026 parliamentary election and a likely constitutional referendum on the horizon. While mutually beneficial economic gains can often help reduce ethnic tensions, these benefits, in this case, are overshadowed by the lack of closure for past crimes. The sacrifice of Armenia’s claims with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, its refugees and its cultural heritage, in exchange for the distant prospect of regional prosperity is a difficult concession for both Armenians at home and those in the diaspora, to accept. Many feel they have been forced into a peace deal they loathe – “peace from the barrel of a gun.”
The Washington framework and the coming steps to try to secure the peace will likely deepen the profound political rift in the Armenian political space. This would create conditions highly favorable to Russian political interference in the near future and could further destabilize the position of Pashinyan, whose popular support is already precarious.
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