Politics
‘Talk of the Collapse of Russia is Pure Propaganda’
July 24, 2024
- Grigorii GolosovPolitical scientist
In a chapter from his new book, political scientist Grigorii Golosov analyzes global cases of the fight for independence, as well as the collapse of the USSR and decentralization processes in Russia in the 1990s, and comes to the conclusion that today’s Russia is not at risk of meeting the same fate.
A chapter «Территориальная целостность России» from Grigorii Golosov’s 2024 book, Politicheskiye rezhimy i transformatsii: Rossiya v sravnitel’noy perspektive (Political Regimes and Transformations: Russia in Comparative Perspective), published in Russian by Ruthenia, is republished here with the publisher’s permission
The answer to the question of how Russia's future development trajectory will take shape largely depends on whether it maintains its territorial integrity. After all, if Russia falls apart, then there is no subject for discussion about its political prospects.
Who Endorses the Argument About Russia’s Collapse?
There are three points of view on this matter. One of them, officially shared by the country’s authorities, is that everything is fine with Russian federalism; it is flourishing, providing each region with the freedom to develop in harmonious unity with other regions.
I’m not going to discuss this position, not even because it’s incorrect, but simply because it does not imply any changes for the foreseeable future, while this book is about political dynamics.
The second viewpoint, favored by many opposition intellectuals and foreign-based Russian politicians, is that Russia will experience “real federalization.”
I agree that after democratization, Russia should return to federalism, which simply does not exist now, at least to the extent provided for by the 1993 Constitution. But in that precise order: first restore democracy in the center, and then regulate relations between the center and the periphery. I will talk more meaningfully about the potential character of real federalization later.
The third viewpoint, which is widely proliferated among opposition media sources, is that Russia as a state has no future and after the military defeat predicted by supporters of this position, Russia will certainly collapse.
The main beneficiary of this position is the Ukrainian government, for whom, in order to patriotically raise public morale, it’s important to convince their citizens that after a complete victory — which from this perspective, must seem inevitable, of course—the Russian problem will be solved once and for all.
The simple (although erroneous, in my opinion) logic in this case boils down to the thesis “No Russia, no problem.” The second beneficiary is the Russian authorities, who intimidate the population by claiming that Russia’s enemies want to “dismember” it, and that the only way to avoid this is to rally around Putin.
The answer to the question of how Russia's future development trajectory will take shape largely depends on whether it maintains its territorial integrity. After all, if Russia falls apart, then there is no subject for discussion about its political prospects.
Who Endorses the Argument About Russia’s Collapse?
There are three points of view on this matter. One of them, officially shared by the country’s authorities, is that everything is fine with Russian federalism; it is flourishing, providing each region with the freedom to develop in harmonious unity with other regions.
I’m not going to discuss this position, not even because it’s incorrect, but simply because it does not imply any changes for the foreseeable future, while this book is about political dynamics.
The second viewpoint, favored by many opposition intellectuals and foreign-based Russian politicians, is that Russia will experience “real federalization.”
I agree that after democratization, Russia should return to federalism, which simply does not exist now, at least to the extent provided for by the 1993 Constitution. But in that precise order: first restore democracy in the center, and then regulate relations between the center and the periphery. I will talk more meaningfully about the potential character of real federalization later.
The third viewpoint, which is widely proliferated among opposition media sources, is that Russia as a state has no future and after the military defeat predicted by supporters of this position, Russia will certainly collapse.
The main beneficiary of this position is the Ukrainian government, for whom, in order to patriotically raise public morale, it’s important to convince their citizens that after a complete victory — which from this perspective, must seem inevitable, of course—the Russian problem will be solved once and for all.
The simple (although erroneous, in my opinion) logic in this case boils down to the thesis “No Russia, no problem.” The second beneficiary is the Russian authorities, who intimidate the population by claiming that Russia’s enemies want to “dismember” it, and that the only way to avoid this is to rally around Putin.
“I believe that the main drawback in the theory of Russia’s collapse is the complete ignorance of the simple truth that whenever anything happens, it is to someone’s benefit.”
And this “someone” must be located not outside of Russia, but within it.
In other words, are there domestic political players for whom the collapse of Russia would be a key goal, and not peripheral part of some broader political program? If these players exist, then they, of course, could play a significant role in further Russian political changes. If not, then all talk about collapse is doomed to remain nothing but propagandistic blather.
Independence is Not Always a Desirable Outcome
Before moving on to the substantive part of the conversation, I’d like to briefly touch on the problem of colonialism. That being said, I’m not going to talk about it in what has become the prevailing context in public discussions in the west. There, the conversation is about overcoming the cultural consequences of colonialism in the lives of Western countries themselves.
After all, the problem of decolonization in the world has already been solved, and if the inhabitants of the few remaining colonies are now offered independence, they, as a rule, politely refuse—as happened, for example, in the 2021 referendum in New Caledonia, where, however, there is at least some independence movement. In many other Western overseas territories, such as Aruba or Reunion, no one would dream of giving up their current comfortable status in favor of the dubious benefits that independence would bring.
Of course, with enough imagination, you could tie the current Western discussion to the Russian reality, but I will refrain. However, if you look at the process of decolonization, which was indeed one of the central events of the latter half of the last century, then some useful lessons can be drawn from it.
In a very broad sense, two different, although compatible to a certain extent, models of decolonization can be identified. One of them is a model of active confrontation between the colonial authorities and supporters of independence. This model was often implemented in the form of armed confrontation.
In other words, are there domestic political players for whom the collapse of Russia would be a key goal, and not peripheral part of some broader political program? If these players exist, then they, of course, could play a significant role in further Russian political changes. If not, then all talk about collapse is doomed to remain nothing but propagandistic blather.
Independence is Not Always a Desirable Outcome
Before moving on to the substantive part of the conversation, I’d like to briefly touch on the problem of colonialism. That being said, I’m not going to talk about it in what has become the prevailing context in public discussions in the west. There, the conversation is about overcoming the cultural consequences of colonialism in the lives of Western countries themselves.
After all, the problem of decolonization in the world has already been solved, and if the inhabitants of the few remaining colonies are now offered independence, they, as a rule, politely refuse—as happened, for example, in the 2021 referendum in New Caledonia, where, however, there is at least some independence movement. In many other Western overseas territories, such as Aruba or Reunion, no one would dream of giving up their current comfortable status in favor of the dubious benefits that independence would bring.
Of course, with enough imagination, you could tie the current Western discussion to the Russian reality, but I will refrain. However, if you look at the process of decolonization, which was indeed one of the central events of the latter half of the last century, then some useful lessons can be drawn from it.
In a very broad sense, two different, although compatible to a certain extent, models of decolonization can be identified. One of them is a model of active confrontation between the colonial authorities and supporters of independence. This model was often implemented in the form of armed confrontation.
Barricades in Algiers, 1960. Source: Wiki Commons
The most striking examples here are Algeria and the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, although there are less obvious, but no less significant cases of this kind. For example, the movement for Indian independence was guided, as you know, by the theory of non-violence, but the immediate incentive for the British authorities to make concessions was the mutiny of the sailors of the British Indian Navy in 1946. Of course, armed conflicts did not arise everywhere, but in some cases, granting independence was seen as the only way to prevent them.
The second model, which I would describe as “discharging the ballast,” came to fruition with the collapse of the African colonial empires of France, and then, to a somewhat lesser extent, Great Britain, in the 1960s. Of course, in both cases, the fear that, if the problem wasn’t solved quickly, weapons may become involved, played a significant role. But there were no serious grounds for such fears.
Local ruling groups in the French colonies, for example, were very willing to sit in the French parliament and serve in colonial administrations. For the most part, they would be quite satisfied with this status for the long term. However, this status began to cost the colonialists themselves such a pretty penny that they chose to speed up the process.
The second model, which I would describe as “discharging the ballast,” came to fruition with the collapse of the African colonial empires of France, and then, to a somewhat lesser extent, Great Britain, in the 1960s. Of course, in both cases, the fear that, if the problem wasn’t solved quickly, weapons may become involved, played a significant role. But there were no serious grounds for such fears.
Local ruling groups in the French colonies, for example, were very willing to sit in the French parliament and serve in colonial administrations. For the most part, they would be quite satisfied with this status for the long term. However, this status began to cost the colonialists themselves such a pretty penny that they chose to speed up the process.
“In the latter half of the last century, maintaining colonial empires became an economically unfeasible enterprise.”
Is there a desire for independence in the Russian regions?
Are these models reflected in the Russian reality? I believe only the second one is, and precisely for the reason that the political players who could implement the first are not only absent now, but are unlikely to appear in the future.
There are no movements for the independence of individual regions in modern Russia. The vast majority of them lack not only the political organizations capable of fighting to achieve this goal, but also lack a key prerequisite for the emergence of such organizations: groups of intellectuals who could form an atmosphere conducive to the emergence of an independence movement in the mass consciousness.
National identities are the key to creating such an atmosphere. Let's say that in order to fight for the Voronezh Republic, you must first form a special nation in the minds of the residents of the Voronezh Region. There is currently no such thing. Residents of the region may or may not be proud of being Voronezh residents, but in any case they recognize themselves as Russians, and there is no sign that this will change in the future.
The situation is somewhat different in the eponymous ethnic regions, that is, mainly in the republics. There, largely due to the efforts of the Soviet authorities with their policy of “indigenization,” the sense of local identity is solid.
However, even in the republics, there is no particular desire for independence now. Regional ruling groups, just like the national intelligentsia who spiritually nourish them, are completely integrated into the existing political order, and their desire for independence is no more pronounced than among the inhabitants of the aforementioned Reunion.
Of course, among the republics there are also large, quite wealthy regions that are at least potentially capable of seceding, such as Tatarstan and Yakutia, as well as one region in which a past attempt at secession left too deep a mark on the national identity: Chechnya.
I don’t want to get into a discussion about the future prospects of these republics, but I will note that they have different paths available to them, some of which could lead to a greater independence than they have now, or even complete independence. But even if this happens, it will not result in the collapse of Russia. This is a path open only to a few.
In light of the above, talk about the collapse of Russia seems to be pure, bold-faced propaganda.
Mikhail Gorbachev's Reforms and the Collapse of the USSR
Of course, this argument is given some credibility by references to the experience of the 1990s, when, as many thought, Russia was on the verge of collapse. The level of political decentralization achieved then was indeed quite high. However, this was due to situational circumstances that have long since become a thing of the past.
Are these models reflected in the Russian reality? I believe only the second one is, and precisely for the reason that the political players who could implement the first are not only absent now, but are unlikely to appear in the future.
There are no movements for the independence of individual regions in modern Russia. The vast majority of them lack not only the political organizations capable of fighting to achieve this goal, but also lack a key prerequisite for the emergence of such organizations: groups of intellectuals who could form an atmosphere conducive to the emergence of an independence movement in the mass consciousness.
National identities are the key to creating such an atmosphere. Let's say that in order to fight for the Voronezh Republic, you must first form a special nation in the minds of the residents of the Voronezh Region. There is currently no such thing. Residents of the region may or may not be proud of being Voronezh residents, but in any case they recognize themselves as Russians, and there is no sign that this will change in the future.
The situation is somewhat different in the eponymous ethnic regions, that is, mainly in the republics. There, largely due to the efforts of the Soviet authorities with their policy of “indigenization,” the sense of local identity is solid.
However, even in the republics, there is no particular desire for independence now. Regional ruling groups, just like the national intelligentsia who spiritually nourish them, are completely integrated into the existing political order, and their desire for independence is no more pronounced than among the inhabitants of the aforementioned Reunion.
Of course, among the republics there are also large, quite wealthy regions that are at least potentially capable of seceding, such as Tatarstan and Yakutia, as well as one region in which a past attempt at secession left too deep a mark on the national identity: Chechnya.
I don’t want to get into a discussion about the future prospects of these republics, but I will note that they have different paths available to them, some of which could lead to a greater independence than they have now, or even complete independence. But even if this happens, it will not result in the collapse of Russia. This is a path open only to a few.
In light of the above, talk about the collapse of Russia seems to be pure, bold-faced propaganda.
Mikhail Gorbachev's Reforms and the Collapse of the USSR
Of course, this argument is given some credibility by references to the experience of the 1990s, when, as many thought, Russia was on the verge of collapse. The level of political decentralization achieved then was indeed quite high. However, this was due to situational circumstances that have long since become a thing of the past.
“The key factor in the collapse of the communist regime within the USSR was the way the constitution was constructed, which made the formal structure of the country something like a confederation.”
The Baltic Chain demonstration, organized by supporters of independence for the Soviet Baltic republics. Lithuania, 1989. Source: Wiki Commons
Until the end of the 1980s, this confederation was a facade, because the real backbone of the political system was formed by the Communist Party.
Mikhail Gorbachev, acting in his own political interests, weakened this core, and then Boris Yeltsin, again based on the logic of his own political survival, got rid of it completely.
Partly due to political inertia, the separation of the former Soviet republics from the USSR led to an upsurge in claims to independence among ruling groups in the Russian regions. They saw demands for greater independence as a convenient way to retain power, which was slipping out of their hands after the liquidation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The institutional structure of modern Russia excludes this path of political development. In the vast majority of the regions, the power is held by groups that owe much, if not all, of their status to the Kremlin.
They are well aware that if the country collapses, they are unlikely to retain their power, which in Russia is inextricably linked with control over the economy. No struggle for independence can be expected from them, just as there are no serious local groups that could challenge the current regional authorities under the banner of the struggle for independence. This slogan simply would not work as a means of mass political mobilization.
It should be noted that the decentralization that occurred in Russia in the 1990s was largely due not to the struggle of the regions themselves for independence, but to the logic of “discharging the ballast.” The federal center, busy with macroeconomic reforms and political battles in Moscow, had neither the resources nor the political will to maintain centralized control over the regions.
Mikhail Gorbachev, acting in his own political interests, weakened this core, and then Boris Yeltsin, again based on the logic of his own political survival, got rid of it completely.
Partly due to political inertia, the separation of the former Soviet republics from the USSR led to an upsurge in claims to independence among ruling groups in the Russian regions. They saw demands for greater independence as a convenient way to retain power, which was slipping out of their hands after the liquidation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The institutional structure of modern Russia excludes this path of political development. In the vast majority of the regions, the power is held by groups that owe much, if not all, of their status to the Kremlin.
They are well aware that if the country collapses, they are unlikely to retain their power, which in Russia is inextricably linked with control over the economy. No struggle for independence can be expected from them, just as there are no serious local groups that could challenge the current regional authorities under the banner of the struggle for independence. This slogan simply would not work as a means of mass political mobilization.
It should be noted that the decentralization that occurred in Russia in the 1990s was largely due not to the struggle of the regions themselves for independence, but to the logic of “discharging the ballast.” The federal center, busy with macroeconomic reforms and political battles in Moscow, had neither the resources nor the political will to maintain centralized control over the regions.
Chechen fighters in the First Chechen War (1994-96). Source: Wiki Commons
As for the regional authorities themselves, no one except Chechnya showed any desire to completely rid themselves of Moscow’s patronage. Tatarstan, after holding a successful referendum on “sovereignty” in 1992, did not secede from the Russian Federation. And in 1999, at the peak of local liberation movements, the regional leaders created their own electoral bloc, called “Fatherland — All Russia,” and one of its leaders was President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev.
I think that if the collapse of Russia does come around as the potential consequence of some sort of catastrophic turn of events, it will occur as the result of this “discharge of ballast.” In other words, the complete and final decentralization of Russia can only be carried out in a strictly centralized manner, by forcibly granting independence to the regions. Then, the Voronezh Republic, the Bryansk Sultanate, and anything else will become possible.
For the regions themselves, this scenario is, of course, fraught with dire consequences. Indeed, almost everywhere this would cause a fierce struggle for abandoned power between different local factions, and this struggle would hardly be peaceful.
There are already enough people in the regions who are equipped with weapons and know how to use them, and there will be even more after soldiers start returning from the Ukrainian fronts en masse. The experience of the 1990s showed that “conflict veterans” are powerless against the state machine; they can only defend their benefits and privileges, but if this machine begins to fall apart, then they can easily turn out to be “kingmakers.”
I think that if the collapse of Russia does come around as the potential consequence of some sort of catastrophic turn of events, it will occur as the result of this “discharge of ballast.” In other words, the complete and final decentralization of Russia can only be carried out in a strictly centralized manner, by forcibly granting independence to the regions. Then, the Voronezh Republic, the Bryansk Sultanate, and anything else will become possible.
For the regions themselves, this scenario is, of course, fraught with dire consequences. Indeed, almost everywhere this would cause a fierce struggle for abandoned power between different local factions, and this struggle would hardly be peaceful.
There are already enough people in the regions who are equipped with weapons and know how to use them, and there will be even more after soldiers start returning from the Ukrainian fronts en masse. The experience of the 1990s showed that “conflict veterans” are powerless against the state machine; they can only defend their benefits and privileges, but if this machine begins to fall apart, then they can easily turn out to be “kingmakers.”
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