Politics
A New and Very Dangerous Nuclear World
May 2, 2025
- Alexander GoltsJournalist
Journalist Alexander Golts says Russia and the US, guided by new ideas about security, have decided to abandon mutual control of nuclear weapons in principle, which, in his view, seriously increases the likelihood of a nuclear conflict.
Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev after signing New START, April 2010, Prague.
Source: Wiki Commons
Source: Wiki Commons
The Russian leadership has decided finally to blow up the system of treaties between Moscow and Washington on strategic nuclear weapons that was established over the past half-century. When a Kommersant correspondent recently lamented that the sides had no time left to work out a new treaty to replace the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in February 2026, the Russian foreign minister responded: “what for?”
Lavrov’s answers to questions regarding the reasons for and consequences of abandoning the last of the Russia-US nuclear treaties are rather hard to analyze, as they consist of assertions that he does not even try to back up.
Basically, the only argument for the chief Russian diplomat is Vladimir Putin’s statements: “the president has said that we will never again get into an arms race… We have our own policy, and we know how to ensure the defense capacity of the Russian state… We are, I repeat, self-sufficient, we have everything, [we need], we know how to ensure our defense capacity.”
Russia paused its participation in New START in February 2023, claiming the US was undermining strategic stability by supporting Ukraine. Lavrov, while still referencing Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly where the pause was announced, blames the Biden administration for the collapse of the treaty.
Victim of extended deterrence
Apparently, the Kremlin is really set on abandoning any form of control of nuclear weapons. Given the available information, “extended nuclear deterrence” has finally crystallized as the basis of Moscow’s strategic approach. It, according to analysts close to the Kremlin, boils down to Russia leveraging the threat of using weapons of mass destruction to make other countries agree to Russia’s terms for resolving any conflict.
On November 19, Putin amended Russia’s nuclear doctrine – the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence – informing the outside world of a significant reduction in the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The Kremlin proclaimed its right to strike nuclear states that, even if they themselves have not attacked Russia, aid a nonnuclear state’s aggression against Russia.
Just two days later, on November 21, a Russian medium-range missile, Oreshnik, hit the famous Yuzhmash plant in Dnipro, Ukraine. By using a nuclear weapon delivery vehicle capable of reaching any point on the European continent, the Kremlin demonstrated this “extended deterrence.” On April 24 of this year, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu issued another warning: “Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against it or Belarus, including [aggression] with the use of conventional weapons.”
Lavrov’s answers to questions regarding the reasons for and consequences of abandoning the last of the Russia-US nuclear treaties are rather hard to analyze, as they consist of assertions that he does not even try to back up.
Basically, the only argument for the chief Russian diplomat is Vladimir Putin’s statements: “the president has said that we will never again get into an arms race… We have our own policy, and we know how to ensure the defense capacity of the Russian state… We are, I repeat, self-sufficient, we have everything, [we need], we know how to ensure our defense capacity.”
Russia paused its participation in New START in February 2023, claiming the US was undermining strategic stability by supporting Ukraine. Lavrov, while still referencing Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly where the pause was announced, blames the Biden administration for the collapse of the treaty.
Victim of extended deterrence
Apparently, the Kremlin is really set on abandoning any form of control of nuclear weapons. Given the available information, “extended nuclear deterrence” has finally crystallized as the basis of Moscow’s strategic approach. It, according to analysts close to the Kremlin, boils down to Russia leveraging the threat of using weapons of mass destruction to make other countries agree to Russia’s terms for resolving any conflict.
On November 19, Putin amended Russia’s nuclear doctrine – the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence – informing the outside world of a significant reduction in the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The Kremlin proclaimed its right to strike nuclear states that, even if they themselves have not attacked Russia, aid a nonnuclear state’s aggression against Russia.
Just two days later, on November 21, a Russian medium-range missile, Oreshnik, hit the famous Yuzhmash plant in Dnipro, Ukraine. By using a nuclear weapon delivery vehicle capable of reaching any point on the European continent, the Kremlin demonstrated this “extended deterrence.” On April 24 of this year, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu issued another warning: “Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against it or Belarus, including [aggression] with the use of conventional weapons.”
“When blackmail turns into the main goal of nuclear policy, arms control treaties become a burden.”
To implement such a policy, a state needs to have superiority over the state it is trying to intimidate or at least create the appearance of such superiority. But treaties lay out not only the number of weapons permitted to each side but also their characteristics. Treaties establish extremely thorough procedures for verification and inspection. It seems that now, in the current circumstances, the Kremlin would like to avoid this.
The appearance of superiority
Behind the chest-thumping by Russian leaders about “self-sufficiency,” behind the rosy briefings about new submarines and exotic missiles with nuclear engines, serious problems with Russia’s nuclear potential may be concealed.
In December, at the year-end meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, Putin claimed that 91% of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces had been modernized. Yet this is wholly incongruous with data available precisely thanks to the information that Moscow and Washington were regularly obligated to exchange under New START. That data indicates that Russia has 700 deployed delivery vehicles (land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and strategic bombers) with 1,550 nuclear warheads.
Of these, 34 missiles are the well-known Satan “heavy” missiles (R-36M2/SS-18), produced in the late 1980s and having long passed their designated service life. They are equipped with a total of 340 warheads.
Five of Russia’s 12 strategic nuclear submarines are of the Dolphin class. They were also built in the 1980s and 1990s and were supposed to be decommissioned by 2025. They carry another 320 warheads. Finally, the more than 50 strategic bombers that make up the air component of Russia’s nuclear triad were built 30-40 years ago.
The appearance of superiority
Behind the chest-thumping by Russian leaders about “self-sufficiency,” behind the rosy briefings about new submarines and exotic missiles with nuclear engines, serious problems with Russia’s nuclear potential may be concealed.
In December, at the year-end meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, Putin claimed that 91% of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces had been modernized. Yet this is wholly incongruous with data available precisely thanks to the information that Moscow and Washington were regularly obligated to exchange under New START. That data indicates that Russia has 700 deployed delivery vehicles (land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and strategic bombers) with 1,550 nuclear warheads.
Of these, 34 missiles are the well-known Satan “heavy” missiles (R-36M2/SS-18), produced in the late 1980s and having long passed their designated service life. They are equipped with a total of 340 warheads.
Five of Russia’s 12 strategic nuclear submarines are of the Dolphin class. They were also built in the 1980s and 1990s and were supposed to be decommissioned by 2025. They carry another 320 warheads. Finally, the more than 50 strategic bombers that make up the air component of Russia’s nuclear triad were built 30-40 years ago.
“Thus, about half of all Russian warheads are deployed on delivery vehicles that are either past their service life or are approaching it.”
Successful launch of Sarmat ICBM held at Plesetsk Cosmodrome. Source: Wiki Commons
Meanwhile, replacing old delivery vehicles with new ones has been a challenge for Moscow. The main problem is the new Sarmat heavy missile. It was supposed to replace the Satan SS-18. The Sarmat was said to be “almost ready” back in 2016. Military leaders promised to start deploying these missiles in 2020. However, each year their deployment has been pushed back.
It was not until 2022 that the first and only successful test of the missile was conducted. Contrary to previous practice (usually up to 10 successful tests were required), this was enough for the Sarmat to be approved for combat duty.
Since then, however, nothing has been reported on the number of deployed missiles. If New START had remained in effect, the Americans would have demanded an inspection within six months of these statements to find out exactly which missiles had been deployed. Now, no one knows for sure what missiles Russia has and how many. According to deterrence theory, the weaker side should be interested in such maximum opacity. Thus, it is plausible that the Kremlin ditched New START to conceal a gradual reduction of Russia’s nuclear potential.
New “Star Wars”
Washington, meanwhile, is doing its part to finish off the nuclear arms control system. Trump has made several vague comments about his interest in “denuclearization” together with Russia and China.
The latter’s involvement in potential future agreements seems unlikely, to put it mildly. While Moscow and Washington are roughly at parity, China refuses to even provide data on the number of its missiles and warheads.
In any case, experts say China has approximately 300 strategic warheads, five times fewer than Russia and the US. Thus, to achieve parity, which is the starting point for any talks, either China needs to build up its nuclear potential to the level of Russia and the US or Washington and Moscow need to reduce their weapons on an unprecedented scale. Neither option seems likely.
More seriously, Trump is paving the way for a new arms race. In late January, he signed an executive order to create “Golden Dome,” a missile defense system covering the entire territory of the US, much more ambitious than Israel’s Iron Dome. Conceptually speaking, it is the heir to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly known as “Star Wars.”
Golden Dome is designed to intercept ballistic, hypersonic and advanced cruise missiles from countries that are equals to the US in terms of military power, namely Russia and China. A huge number of satellites with hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking capabilities would be sent into space, ensuring early detection of threats and timely interception.
Orbital platforms equipped with means to intercept enemy missiles at the boost phase are also to be deployed in space. Land- and sea-based missile defense systems would intercept enemy missiles at all subsequent phases of flight. Finally, preemptive strikes against enemy nuclear forces, including cyberattacks and electronic warfare, could be carried out. Technologies would be developed to destroy targets with directed energy, electronic interference and other non-kinetic effects.
This project involves huge capital investments. Experts estimate the cost of a system like Golden Dome between $430 billion and $5.3 trillion. Republicans in the US Congress have already proposed a $27 billion allocation for Golden Dome as part of an already-approved defense package. It should come as no surprise that more than 180 defense companies, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing and, of course, Elon Musk’s SpaceX have announced their readiness to participate in the project.
Undermining the basis of future agreements
The idea of complete protection of the entire territory of the US contradicts the principles upon which all treaties between Russia and the US have been based.
It was not until 2022 that the first and only successful test of the missile was conducted. Contrary to previous practice (usually up to 10 successful tests were required), this was enough for the Sarmat to be approved for combat duty.
Since then, however, nothing has been reported on the number of deployed missiles. If New START had remained in effect, the Americans would have demanded an inspection within six months of these statements to find out exactly which missiles had been deployed. Now, no one knows for sure what missiles Russia has and how many. According to deterrence theory, the weaker side should be interested in such maximum opacity. Thus, it is plausible that the Kremlin ditched New START to conceal a gradual reduction of Russia’s nuclear potential.
New “Star Wars”
Washington, meanwhile, is doing its part to finish off the nuclear arms control system. Trump has made several vague comments about his interest in “denuclearization” together with Russia and China.
The latter’s involvement in potential future agreements seems unlikely, to put it mildly. While Moscow and Washington are roughly at parity, China refuses to even provide data on the number of its missiles and warheads.
In any case, experts say China has approximately 300 strategic warheads, five times fewer than Russia and the US. Thus, to achieve parity, which is the starting point for any talks, either China needs to build up its nuclear potential to the level of Russia and the US or Washington and Moscow need to reduce their weapons on an unprecedented scale. Neither option seems likely.
More seriously, Trump is paving the way for a new arms race. In late January, he signed an executive order to create “Golden Dome,” a missile defense system covering the entire territory of the US, much more ambitious than Israel’s Iron Dome. Conceptually speaking, it is the heir to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly known as “Star Wars.”
Golden Dome is designed to intercept ballistic, hypersonic and advanced cruise missiles from countries that are equals to the US in terms of military power, namely Russia and China. A huge number of satellites with hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking capabilities would be sent into space, ensuring early detection of threats and timely interception.
Orbital platforms equipped with means to intercept enemy missiles at the boost phase are also to be deployed in space. Land- and sea-based missile defense systems would intercept enemy missiles at all subsequent phases of flight. Finally, preemptive strikes against enemy nuclear forces, including cyberattacks and electronic warfare, could be carried out. Technologies would be developed to destroy targets with directed energy, electronic interference and other non-kinetic effects.
This project involves huge capital investments. Experts estimate the cost of a system like Golden Dome between $430 billion and $5.3 trillion. Republicans in the US Congress have already proposed a $27 billion allocation for Golden Dome as part of an already-approved defense package. It should come as no surprise that more than 180 defense companies, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing and, of course, Elon Musk’s SpaceX have announced their readiness to participate in the project.
Undermining the basis of future agreements
The idea of complete protection of the entire territory of the US contradicts the principles upon which all treaties between Russia and the US have been based.
“The possession of a robust shield by one side was recognized half a century ago (after much debate, mind you) as a destabilizing factor.”
Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signing the SALT II Treaty, June 1979, Vienna.
Source: Wiki Commons
Source: Wiki Commons
The side in possession of such a missile defense system has the incentive to launch a preemptive strike – after all, it expects to be able to repel a retaliatory strike.
The other side will constantly increase its strike capabilities in the hope of overcoming the missile shield. It is no coincidence that the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) was signed in 1972 simultaneously with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). The ABMT, recall, was negotiated and signed at the initiative of the US. However, the US approach then did a one-eighty.
Reagan’s SDI was a direct challenge to the ABMT. The treaty, however, survived the 1980s and 1990s. At that time, Washington did not want to complicate the situation for Moscow, which was dealing with serious economic and political turbulence. In the early 2000s, however, the George W Bush administration staked out a position against any missile defense restrictions. In 2002, the US withdrew from the ABMT, insisting that it did not intend to violate strategic stability and that the goal was to intercept one-off missiles that North Korea and Iran might have.
At the time, this was the case. The 44 US interceptors stationed in Alaska and California were clearly incapable of destroying hundreds of Russian missiles. The situation has now changed, however: with the start of work on Golden Dome, which explicitly aims to protect against Russian missiles, the rug is simply pulled out from under future treaties.
Thus, both Russia and the US, guided by new ideas about security, have decided to abandon mutual control of nuclear weapons in principle. This seriously increases the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. In the absence of reliable information about the arsenal of a potential enemy, the military will overstate the enemy’s capabilities, interpreting all its actions as the highest threat.
In the absence of treaty restrictions, a new nuclear arms race is inevitable.
The other side will constantly increase its strike capabilities in the hope of overcoming the missile shield. It is no coincidence that the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) was signed in 1972 simultaneously with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). The ABMT, recall, was negotiated and signed at the initiative of the US. However, the US approach then did a one-eighty.
Reagan’s SDI was a direct challenge to the ABMT. The treaty, however, survived the 1980s and 1990s. At that time, Washington did not want to complicate the situation for Moscow, which was dealing with serious economic and political turbulence. In the early 2000s, however, the George W Bush administration staked out a position against any missile defense restrictions. In 2002, the US withdrew from the ABMT, insisting that it did not intend to violate strategic stability and that the goal was to intercept one-off missiles that North Korea and Iran might have.
At the time, this was the case. The 44 US interceptors stationed in Alaska and California were clearly incapable of destroying hundreds of Russian missiles. The situation has now changed, however: with the start of work on Golden Dome, which explicitly aims to protect against Russian missiles, the rug is simply pulled out from under future treaties.
Thus, both Russia and the US, guided by new ideas about security, have decided to abandon mutual control of nuclear weapons in principle. This seriously increases the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. In the absence of reliable information about the arsenal of a potential enemy, the military will overstate the enemy’s capabilities, interpreting all its actions as the highest threat.
In the absence of treaty restrictions, a new nuclear arms race is inevitable.
“In the event of a crisis, when developments unfold rapidly and there is very little time to make decisions, the lack of a system of mutual control and the lack of information can end in disaster.”
Bad example for others
The refusal of the two states possessing more than 90% of all nuclear weapons on the planet to implement a system of mutual control also sets an extremely bad example for other states. The nonproliferation regime is already coming apart at the seams. Let us not forget that the refusal of most states to try to obtain nuclear weapons is directly tied to the obligation of nuclear states to reduce their arsenals or, at least, to negotiate on this matter.
Now, Moscow and Washington are effectively abrogating this obligation. In this environment, the end of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is only a matter of time. In the eyes of many states, nuclear weapons are turning into a legitimate instrument of ensuring security. For a long time, the fact that India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons was seen as incentivizing them to avoid direct armed conflict; but now, with tensions between New Dheli and Islamabad rising, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif threatens to use nuclear weapons.
Naturally, as the system of control of nuclear weapons weakens, the danger of their use rises, both globally and regionally. This could end in the end of humanity.
But maybe we will get lucky and in a few years the leading nuclear powers will recognize the danger, as they did after the Cuban missile crisis. Then they will take on the painstaking task of rebuilding the system they are so carelessly destroying today. In the meantime, welcome to the new nuclear world. It is very dangerous.
The refusal of the two states possessing more than 90% of all nuclear weapons on the planet to implement a system of mutual control also sets an extremely bad example for other states. The nonproliferation regime is already coming apart at the seams. Let us not forget that the refusal of most states to try to obtain nuclear weapons is directly tied to the obligation of nuclear states to reduce their arsenals or, at least, to negotiate on this matter.
Now, Moscow and Washington are effectively abrogating this obligation. In this environment, the end of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is only a matter of time. In the eyes of many states, nuclear weapons are turning into a legitimate instrument of ensuring security. For a long time, the fact that India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons was seen as incentivizing them to avoid direct armed conflict; but now, with tensions between New Dheli and Islamabad rising, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif threatens to use nuclear weapons.
Naturally, as the system of control of nuclear weapons weakens, the danger of their use rises, both globally and regionally. This could end in the end of humanity.
But maybe we will get lucky and in a few years the leading nuclear powers will recognize the danger, as they did after the Cuban missile crisis. Then they will take on the painstaking task of rebuilding the system they are so carelessly destroying today. In the meantime, welcome to the new nuclear world. It is very dangerous.
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