Politics
‘North Korea’s Ruling Elite Is Convinced that Serious Political Liberalization Will Mean Collective Suicide’
June 23, 2025
  • Andrei Lankov

    Professor at Kookmin University (Seoul)
  • Dmitri Goncharov

    Journalist
In an interview, Korea expert Andrei Lankov discusses the opportunities and risks for North Korea amid the US-China confrontation, the life of North Korean workers in Russia and the prospects for reunification.
The original interview in Russian was published in Republic. A shortened version is being republished here with their permission.

Do you believe in the reunification of Korea? Or is this division forever?

Eighty years have passed since the division of the country – that is three generations. Historians know well that even states that emerge as a result of an artificial division along arbitrary administrative borders form their own national identity over time.
By and large, the political elites in both Seoul and Pyongyang never really sought a peaceful unification of the country, that is, one achieved through negotiations and compromises. Everyone understood the utopian nature of such a scenario. In certain periods, of course, the sides were disposed to unification by violently subjugating one another.

The current international situation is such that the likelihood of serious changes on the Korean Peninsula is close to zero. One of the results of the US-China confrontation has been the decision of the Chinese leadership to take North Korea under its wing and provide it with assistance – modest assistance, but enough for North Korea to survive.
“Beijing’s main goal is to ensure the status quo in the region, which entails preserving the North Korean state and thus the division of Korea indefinitely.”
North Korean citizens paying respect to the statues of Kim Il Sung (left) and Kim Jong Il at the Mansu Hill Grand Monument. Source: Wiki Commons
Moreover, in the (extremely unlikely) event of popular unrest or an attempted coup d’état in North Korea, direct Chinese intervention on the side of the current government seems entirely possible.

In the past, talk of unification was driven largely by the fact that a significant portion of the population of both the North and the South once genuinely sought a restoration of national unity. However, those times have passed. Interest in the idea of unification has naturally waned among the populations of both Koreas over time.

It is hard to assess the situation in the North – after all, you cannot do polling there. Nevertheless, it is significant that it was the North, in the person of Kim Jong-un, that was the first to reject the idea of unification and declare the existence of two sovereign states on the Korean peninsula.

In the South, polls show that the younger the Southerner, the less interested they are in unification. And those under 35 have no desire to unite with the North at all. This is due primarily to how poor the North is, and [South Koreans] are not eager to take on the huge fiscal burden that would inevitably come from unification. The German experience was a lesson for many.

How powerful is the trauma of the Korean War in society?

Oddly enough, the influence of the Korean War, which started 75 years ago, on relations between the two Koreas is not as great as one might expect. It is not even that a lot of time has passed since the war, though this is a factor. Mostly, this is attributable to the place that the war occupies in the historical memory of both Koreas and how it is reflected in their cinema, literature and popular art.

In the North, the Korean War is presented almost exclusively as a case of external aggression. They hush up the fact that on the other side of the front line, it was mostly other Koreans who were fighting. In movies and literature and even in textbooks, it is almost always about the Americans, that is, it is a war against an external aggressor that attacked North Korea.

In South Korea, by contrast, the dominant narrative has long been one in which the Korean War is presented as a national tragedy for which no one, including the North Korean government, bears direct responsibility. In addition, South Korean filmmakers and writers, who are naturally predominantly leftist, usually stress that extreme brutality was committed by both sides.

But South Korea is a democratic country, so several versions of national history coexist. And the version in which the Korean War is perceived as a treacherous attack on South Korea by bloodthirsty communists in the North also exists, but it is popular among a very small part of the population. Mostly very old people.

How important a role does China play for North Korea?

North Korea’s relations with China have always been complicated. From China’s perspective, North Korea is a problematic neighbor and an ungrateful ally that tends to ignore China’s interests. That is why, over the past 30 or 40 years, the two countries have had periods of relative warming and periods of extreme tension in their relations.
But the situation has now changed in a favorable direction for North Korea. Amid the US-China confrontation, North Korea is perceived in Beijing primarily as a strategically important buffer that protects the borders of China.

In this situation, China is willing to spend considerable resources to keep North Korea afloat without making any arduous demands on Pyongyang. North Korea, while taking advantage of this situation, has not forgotten that China is also a potential threat and demonstrates a certain caution.
“It is no coincidence that tourists from Russia are allowed to visit North Korea and are even being courted, but Chinese tourism is still prohibited.”
The China-North Korea relationship being celebrated at the Arirang Mass Games in Pyongyang. September 2010. Source: Wiki Commons
How does North Korea see the threat from China? Has China made impossible demands?

Sometimes, China has demanded important things. Not to have dynastic succession. To carry out reforms. Not to develop nuclear weapons. Not to develop weapons to carry them. To talk more about the role of the Chinese army in the Korean War – and with more respect. Not to confiscate Chinese investments.

Also, China maintained relations with Kim Jong-un’s disgraced brother. And this is not the full list.

China wants a controlled and problem-free North Korea, which runs counter to Korea’s own national interests, as they are understood by North Korean elites at least.
Kim Jong-un with former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu at the ceremonies marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War in Pyongyang. July 2023. Source: Wiki Commons
Let’s talk about Russia-North Korea relations and the presence of North Korean soldiers in Kursk Region. What do you think about the military and perhaps, in the near future, economic penetration of North Korea into Russia?

I would not say that the presence of North Korean soldiers in Kursk Region can be considered “North Korean military penetration into Russia.”

As for the presence of North Korean workers, there is no doubt their numbers will increase sharply in the foreseeable future.

In 2016, there were just over 30,000 North Korean workers in Russia, three quarters of whom were construction workers. It is estimated that there are currently 10,000-15,000 North Koreans working in Russia. I believe this is just the beginning.
“Economic cooperation is beneficial to everyone: Russian companies, the North Korean government and, most importantly, the North Korean workers.”
Kim Jong-un meeting with Vladimir Putin in April 2019. Source: Wiki Commons
The money that stays in the pocket of the average worker, even after he has paid all the necessary money to his boss, is an astronomical sum by North Korean standards.

How much do North Koreans earn in Russia versus North Korea?

About three quarters of workers in Russia are “on contract,” meaning they are required to transfer a certain, prearranged amount to their boss every month. Anything they earn over that amount is theirs to keep. On average, in 2010-20 a North Korean working in Russia saved (not earned, saved!) about $1,500 a year.

There were no restrictions on the duration of work trips, but in practice, they worked in Russia for 3-4 years and brought back $5,000-6,000. In Pyongyang in 2019 (that is, before Covid shook everything up), the average real income, including numerous side hustles, was about $70-80 a month.

There has been no shortage of goods in North Korea for some time now – there is just no money. Refrigerators and cars are available for anyone to purchase. You can also buy an apartment, though with the above mentioned amount there is no point in even looking at real estate in Pyongyang: the most dilapidated apartments start at about $30,000.
“The $5,000-6,000 that an average North Korean brings back from a stint in Russia can be used, for example, to purchase an indefinite lease on a retail location at a market or a kiosk on the outskirts of the city.”
That location, which will be run by the worker’s wife, will generate earnings of $150-200 a month, that is, double or triple the average income in Pyongyang.

There are other options: for example, in coastal cities you can buy a small fishing boat for $1,000-2,000. Then you can register it as belonging to some government entity, hire a couple of sailors and go fishing for pollock or squid – it’s a hard and somewhat dangerous business, but much more profitable than a retail outlet.

When North Koreans apply to go work in Russia, of course, they have to pay a bribe – to the boss, to the officer from the security services, to the medical commission, to the technical skills commission. It comes to about $400, which is not a small sum for most people, but what can you do? No one is going to give a great job abroad away for free.

Is it true that North Korea shoots people over grains of rice?

They do over cows. But over grains, no. Theft of state property is very bad. In one recent TV series, [this topic] was raised for the first time: an official illicitly sells rice and fertilizers off of trucks. In reality, this is a common thing; what is unusual is that it is being shown on TV.

Do North Koreans watch South Korean doramas?

It would not be an exaggeration to say that over the past 15-20 years, South Korean TV shows have been perhaps the most popular genre among urban youth in the North. But the situation has changed recently: Kim Jong-un is totally against the penetration of South Korean – and indeed any foreign – mass culture products into the country.
Penalties for copying, distributing and watching such shows have been considerably stiffened in recent years, and now many are afraid to watch them and it has become much harder to get ahold of them. Still, people, especially the privileged segments of society, watch doramas, albeit on a smaller scale.
“The kids of the elite are as obsessed with South Korean doramas as before, and they watch them with less fear than common folk.”
If North Korea were not under so many sanctions, could the regime soften and eventually change?

It’s important to understand that before 2006, there were no international sanctions against North Korea at all. And up until 2017, the sanctions that were in effect targeted mostly arms, equipment for the defense industry and luxury goods.

In the 1970s, Western companies actively pursued economic cooperation with North Korea; they started operations there and usually lost a lot of money. This continued until the early 2000s, with Western businesses sometimes even launching joint ventures [with North Korea]. Most of these projects, however, never delivered any tangible profit to investors – but the reason was hardly sanctions.

Since 2017, North Korea has indeed been extremely heavily sanctioned. Today, these sanctions are the most important factor holding back the development of the North Korean economy.

But for many decades, the main constraints on the economy were completely different. In part, it was chronic, structural problems of the command economy, which in North Korea had taken the most extreme forms. In part, it was the extreme militarization of the entire economic system.

In North Korea, the ruling elite is convinced that serious political liberalization will mean collective suicide – perhaps even literally.

The division of the country, as well as the colossal gap in living standards and incomes between the North and the South (based on official North Korean data, per capita GDP in the South is 25 times that in the North), creates a high likelihood that a weakening of control over the population in the North could lead to German-style reunification under the aegis of the South.

This means the North Korean elite is threatened with the loss of everything: their power and privileges and, in some cases, their freedom and their lives. At least that’s what they think. I am inclined to believe that their fears are not unfounded.

Kim learned a lot in Switzerland. First of all, he got a good idea of how the outside world works, and this knowledge allows him to manipulate this world adeptly.
“It was thanks to his Swiss experience that Kim Jong-un carried out a series of very effective economic reforms in 2012-18.”
They were market-based, in many ways reminiscent of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, and produced tangible results. However, the reforms had to be rolled back later due to objective circumstances – the serious tightening of the sanctions regime in 2017-19.

It has been written that wearing jeans is illegal in North Korea, as they symbolize US imperialism. I have also read about a ban on piercings and strict rules on hairstyles. Which of the myths about North Korea have a basis in fact and which do not?

In North Korea, piercings are indeed prohibited, and it is also forbidden to dye your hair any color except black. That said, the claims in the press that everyone in North Korea is required to have one haircut from a prescribed list are a hoax.

About jeans: it’s 100% true. And this policy against jeans sometimes takes completely absurd forms. In a UK popular-science program about gardening, which was shown on North Korean TV (yes, they show such programs!), the editors blurred the jeans that the presenter was wearing.

You sometimes hear that the Korean nation has split into two completely different camps: obedient slaves in the North and creative people in the South. Do you agree?

I absolutely disagree. The North Korean population does what the authorities demand of them, performing obligatory rituals – many of which seem completely absurd to an outside observer – without asking any questions. Like laying flowers and bowing deeply at monuments to the Kims on every holiday, or publicly repenting at weekly “self-criticism sessions.”
“However, both in business and in terms of solving everyday problems, people show amazing ingenuity.”
Doing business in North Korea requires no less creativity than in the South. At the very least, you need to be ready to adapt to a constantly changing situation. A significant segment of the North Korean population works in private business.

Just imagine how much creativity you need to be a North Korean engineer. How is equipment repaired in the South? An engineer replaces the broken unit, strictly following the instructions, and everything works again. But a North Korean engineer needs to maintain equipment that came from the USSR 60 years ago or even from Japan 110 years ago.

North Koreans simply know which rules are unsafe to break and behave accordingly.
But we should not assume they actually dream only of liberation and liberal democracy. Most North Koreans have other dreams, other ideas about the ideal structure of society. There is no guarantee that I, as well as most readers, will like these dreams and ideas. That said, they are definitely very different from what is being preached at Juche ideology lectures today.
Share this article
Read More
You consent to processing your personal data and accept our privacy policy