Politics
Is a Large-Scale Russian Offensive Imminent in Eastern Ukraine?
May 30, 2025
- Nikolay MitrokhinАcademic Researcher, Research Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen (Germany)
Russia continues to inch forward on the battlefield in Ukraine, but each inch is coming at a high cost. Meanwhile, as hopes for a negotiated ceasefire appear to fade, the Kremlin seems to be preparing a large-scale offensive to establish a buffer zone.
The original text in Russian was published in Republic. A shortened version is being republished here with their permission.
On the surface, the situation in Ukraine over the past few weeks looks as if the process of peace negotiations, a halt to hostilities and an end to the war that was set in motion by Trump three months ago has finally died. Trump has gone from praising Putin and showing some goodwill toward Zelensky earlier this week to threatening the former and subjecting the latter to a new bout of criticism.
Peace process?
This seems entirely unsurprising after Russia rejected a 30-day ceasefire and sent to Istanbul for negotiations a delegation of rather low-ranking officials, who repeated the political leadership’s demand that the four regions of Ukraine partially or fully occupied by Russia at the moment be handed over without a fight.
In addition, the Russian president announced on May 22 the establishment of a buffer zone along the Russia-Ukraine border. Though there were no significant changes on the battlefield after this, Russia and Ukraine launched new large-scale attacks through the air, including strikes on energy facilities (on the night of May 26, Trump was so moved as to say that he did not recognize his friend Putin).
On May 21, German Chancellor Merz commented that “there are currently no signs that this war will end quickly.”
Nevertheless, the negotiations that began in Istanbul have been commented on rather reservedly, if not somewhat favorably, by the Ukrainian sides. On May 23, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha unexpectedly announced: “we are also working on... a meeting between President Zelensky and Putin. We allow that this meeting may be in an expanded format. We would very much like President Trump to join it.”
On May 26, Sybiha discussed the matter of putting together a new Ukrainian delegation for the next round of negotiations.
On the surface, the situation in Ukraine over the past few weeks looks as if the process of peace negotiations, a halt to hostilities and an end to the war that was set in motion by Trump three months ago has finally died. Trump has gone from praising Putin and showing some goodwill toward Zelensky earlier this week to threatening the former and subjecting the latter to a new bout of criticism.
Peace process?
This seems entirely unsurprising after Russia rejected a 30-day ceasefire and sent to Istanbul for negotiations a delegation of rather low-ranking officials, who repeated the political leadership’s demand that the four regions of Ukraine partially or fully occupied by Russia at the moment be handed over without a fight.
In addition, the Russian president announced on May 22 the establishment of a buffer zone along the Russia-Ukraine border. Though there were no significant changes on the battlefield after this, Russia and Ukraine launched new large-scale attacks through the air, including strikes on energy facilities (on the night of May 26, Trump was so moved as to say that he did not recognize his friend Putin).
On May 21, German Chancellor Merz commented that “there are currently no signs that this war will end quickly.”
Nevertheless, the negotiations that began in Istanbul have been commented on rather reservedly, if not somewhat favorably, by the Ukrainian sides. On May 23, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha unexpectedly announced: “we are also working on... a meeting between President Zelensky and Putin. We allow that this meeting may be in an expanded format. We would very much like President Trump to join it.”
On May 26, Sybiha discussed the matter of putting together a new Ukrainian delegation for the next round of negotiations.
Russian POWs being handed over to Russia by Ukraine as part of the latest and biggest-yet prisoner swap. May 2025. Source: VK
The first tangible result of these contacts was the largest prisoner swap of the war, carried out on May 23-25, during which 1,000 people were released by each side, including 120 civilians, who are usually freed only reluctantly.
According to the Ukrainian side, of the 120 such people handed over to Russia, 70 were “collaborators” (at least three of them were said to be spies). The Russians reported that these 120 were residents of Kursk Region, having been taken to Ukraine after the capture of Sudzha.
In addition, by May 27 we had learned that Russia had handed over as civilians Ukrainians who had previously been in Ukrainian prison, as well as other Ukrainian citizens who had been sentenced by Russian courts to deportation. Still, who actually went home remains unclear, since information about the civilians involved, unlike military personnel, was not publicly presented.
The man responsible for organizing the swap on the Russian side, Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin, against the backdrop of the freed Russian soldiers expressed hope that this event would create “a favorable atmosphere for discussing a settlement" to the war. Such phrases had not been used during previous prisoner exchanges.
According to the Ukrainian side, of the 120 such people handed over to Russia, 70 were “collaborators” (at least three of them were said to be spies). The Russians reported that these 120 were residents of Kursk Region, having been taken to Ukraine after the capture of Sudzha.
In addition, by May 27 we had learned that Russia had handed over as civilians Ukrainians who had previously been in Ukrainian prison, as well as other Ukrainian citizens who had been sentenced by Russian courts to deportation. Still, who actually went home remains unclear, since information about the civilians involved, unlike military personnel, was not publicly presented.
The man responsible for organizing the swap on the Russian side, Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin, against the backdrop of the freed Russian soldiers expressed hope that this event would create “a favorable atmosphere for discussing a settlement" to the war. Such phrases had not been used during previous prisoner exchanges.
“The negotiation process has seemingly moved into a format that suits Russia, with the sides not making specific commitments and not accepting restrictions on how they conduct the war.”
Russian Invasion of Ukraine as of 18 May 2025. Source: Wiki Commons
Meanwhile, some steps are being taken behind closed doors, being communicated to Trump as the mediator, who, after the apparent failure of Istanbul, has de facto stopped pushing Russia and Ukraine to conclude a deal as soon as possible.
It remains unclear whether the sides have taken as a starting point any previously negotiated frameworks and at what pace this is proceeding. The success of these negotiations likely depends, to a large extent, on whether Russia will launch a large-scale offensive in June with the reserves it has accumulated so far this year.
Putin’s buffer zone: Dreams versus reality
In this context, Putin’s statement (made after a visit to Kursk Region on May 21) announcing the start of work to create a buffer zone still looks to be rather a declaration of intent. Important Stories has calculated that since June 13, 2023, Putin has spoken about a buffer zone eight times already.
When attempting to carve one out in 2024 (in north Kharkiv Region), Russian troops encountered such heavy resistance from the Ukrainian army that they were unable to advance more than 15 kilometers in any of the four segments that were part of the attack. This attempt generally ended in battles for the city of Vovchansk, 8 kilometers from the border. The Russians managed to capture only about half of it, and the city was almost completely destroyed.
Last week, Ukrainian sources acknowledged the recapture by Russian troops of three villages north of Sudzha that were part of the Ukrainian-held salient that extended into Russian territory. Yet these villages were retaken about two months ago. Fighting continues in the area between them and the village of Loknya, whose outskirts the Russian army reached a month ago before being forced to retreat. According to the Ukrainian side, the Russians have had no further luck there.
According to Russian information (the @dva_majors Telegram channel, citing Russia’s Battlegroup North), there was a breakthrough to new lines just last weekend, but photo or video confirmation is lacking. The same channel posted a video from Sumy Region showing a dozen destroyed vehicles and pieces of equipment with the following description: “the road of war. The establishment of a buffer zone comes at a high price. Equipment burns every day; it does not last long on the front line.”
It remains unclear whether the sides have taken as a starting point any previously negotiated frameworks and at what pace this is proceeding. The success of these negotiations likely depends, to a large extent, on whether Russia will launch a large-scale offensive in June with the reserves it has accumulated so far this year.
Putin’s buffer zone: Dreams versus reality
In this context, Putin’s statement (made after a visit to Kursk Region on May 21) announcing the start of work to create a buffer zone still looks to be rather a declaration of intent. Important Stories has calculated that since June 13, 2023, Putin has spoken about a buffer zone eight times already.
When attempting to carve one out in 2024 (in north Kharkiv Region), Russian troops encountered such heavy resistance from the Ukrainian army that they were unable to advance more than 15 kilometers in any of the four segments that were part of the attack. This attempt generally ended in battles for the city of Vovchansk, 8 kilometers from the border. The Russians managed to capture only about half of it, and the city was almost completely destroyed.
Last week, Ukrainian sources acknowledged the recapture by Russian troops of three villages north of Sudzha that were part of the Ukrainian-held salient that extended into Russian territory. Yet these villages were retaken about two months ago. Fighting continues in the area between them and the village of Loknya, whose outskirts the Russian army reached a month ago before being forced to retreat. According to the Ukrainian side, the Russians have had no further luck there.
According to Russian information (the @dva_majors Telegram channel, citing Russia’s Battlegroup North), there was a breakthrough to new lines just last weekend, but photo or video confirmation is lacking. The same channel posted a video from Sumy Region showing a dozen destroyed vehicles and pieces of equipment with the following description: “the road of war. The establishment of a buffer zone comes at a high price. Equipment burns every day; it does not last long on the front line.”
“Even Russian voenkory express serious doubts that the effort to create a buffer zone will be successful.”
Defense Minister Andrei Belousov (center) visiting Battlegroup Center in May 2025. Source: VK
The issue is that it entails a huge amount of territory coming under Russian control through fighting, and that territory has natural features that make it well suited for defense – forests and swamps, rivers and streams – and is mined and seemingly ready to be defended.
Whatever is captured will then have to be defended, costing more lives. In other words, establishing a buffer zone will be costly for the Russians, and there is no guarantee of success.
Ukrainian media and war bloggers writing on the topic argue that drone warfare makes discussions about military control of territory tens or even hundreds of kilometers from the border meaningless. However, they fail to take into account FPV drones, which are a major problem both for Russian soldiers and for Russian civilians right behind the front lines. In this regard, a buffer zone makes sense.
The Ukrainian side has reacted to the Russian effort by announcing the evacuation of 200 settlements in Sumy Region – the northern part of the region will be deserted to a depth of at least 30 kilometers from the border.
Speaking to the likelihood of a Russian offensive is the appointment of Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev, known for his tough offensive tactics and role in the siege of Mariupol (the largest city captured and held by the Russian army in the war), as commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces on May 15.
Also seeming to confirm an imminent offensive is the visit of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov to Battlegroup Center on May 20 – where he was officially reported to have “listened to reports from the commander and officers and set a number of tasks” – as well as Putin’s visit the following day to Kursk and the Kursk NPP (where, presumably, one of the headquarters of Battlegroup North is located).
Front-line update
The line of contact has started to move actively in some areas over the past two weeks. The Ukrainian army has been forced to retreat, primarily in the central and southern parts of the Donetsk front.
The Russian advance has been marked by the appearance of “greenery” – cover to protect storm troops against drones – and by a change in FPV drone tactics – Russian drones have become visibly more numerous and are operating deeper behind Ukrainian lines, undermining logistics.
Last week, the first Russian grenade-launching FPV drone hit a target in Kharkiv, i.e., 40 kilometers from the front line. Strongholds of the Ukrainian army in the near rear are spotted with drones and targeted with artillery or aerial bombs.
Anti-drone UAVs designed to take down these drones (with pump-action shotguns, for example) have yet to enter mass production, however.
The Russian army is also actively putting storm troopers on motorcycles to cross fields quickly and occupy successive forest belts on the Ukrainian side. Though for six months Ukrainian military channels have been showing footage of motorcycles being destroyed by drones or artillery, alongside mocking comments, last week the Ukrainian army announced the creation of the first unit of storm troopers on motorcycles, borrowing this effective tactic from the enemy.
Overall, Russian forces have recently achieved a significant breakthrough of Ukrainian defensive lines between the embattled cities of Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Whatever is captured will then have to be defended, costing more lives. In other words, establishing a buffer zone will be costly for the Russians, and there is no guarantee of success.
Ukrainian media and war bloggers writing on the topic argue that drone warfare makes discussions about military control of territory tens or even hundreds of kilometers from the border meaningless. However, they fail to take into account FPV drones, which are a major problem both for Russian soldiers and for Russian civilians right behind the front lines. In this regard, a buffer zone makes sense.
The Ukrainian side has reacted to the Russian effort by announcing the evacuation of 200 settlements in Sumy Region – the northern part of the region will be deserted to a depth of at least 30 kilometers from the border.
Speaking to the likelihood of a Russian offensive is the appointment of Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev, known for his tough offensive tactics and role in the siege of Mariupol (the largest city captured and held by the Russian army in the war), as commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces on May 15.
Also seeming to confirm an imminent offensive is the visit of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov to Battlegroup Center on May 20 – where he was officially reported to have “listened to reports from the commander and officers and set a number of tasks” – as well as Putin’s visit the following day to Kursk and the Kursk NPP (where, presumably, one of the headquarters of Battlegroup North is located).
Front-line update
The line of contact has started to move actively in some areas over the past two weeks. The Ukrainian army has been forced to retreat, primarily in the central and southern parts of the Donetsk front.
The Russian advance has been marked by the appearance of “greenery” – cover to protect storm troops against drones – and by a change in FPV drone tactics – Russian drones have become visibly more numerous and are operating deeper behind Ukrainian lines, undermining logistics.
Last week, the first Russian grenade-launching FPV drone hit a target in Kharkiv, i.e., 40 kilometers from the front line. Strongholds of the Ukrainian army in the near rear are spotted with drones and targeted with artillery or aerial bombs.
Anti-drone UAVs designed to take down these drones (with pump-action shotguns, for example) have yet to enter mass production, however.
The Russian army is also actively putting storm troopers on motorcycles to cross fields quickly and occupy successive forest belts on the Ukrainian side. Though for six months Ukrainian military channels have been showing footage of motorcycles being destroyed by drones or artillery, alongside mocking comments, last week the Ukrainian army announced the creation of the first unit of storm troopers on motorcycles, borrowing this effective tactic from the enemy.
Overall, Russian forces have recently achieved a significant breakthrough of Ukrainian defensive lines between the embattled cities of Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
“Another unpleasant piece of news for Ukraine was the gradual grinding-down of the last major Ukrainian strongholds in southwest Donetsk Region.”
Russian troops are a stone’s throw from the border of Dnipropetrovsk Region in at least two areas. There is little doubt that by end-June, Russian troops will have reached the border, and not only there. The real question is whether this will become a new defensive line or the offensive will roll on.
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