Politics
The Illusion of Peace Between Armenia and Azerbaijan
May 20, 2025
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Jean-François Ratelle
Affiliated researcher and adjunct professor at the University of Ottawa
Political scientist Jean-François Ratelle is pessimistic on the prospects of a peace agreement in the South Caucasus, where a conflict mindset continues to prevail, driven by ethnic polarization and deep-seated mistrust.
In March 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signaled significant progress toward normalizing their diplomatic relations, raising hopes for a forthcoming peace accord. They announced they had agreed on the text of a draft agreement, including a roadmap to peace.
Following this development, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, whose portfolio includes the Russia-Ukraine war, Middle East hotspots and negotiations with Iran, expressed optimism for a final settlement and discussed the potential for Armenia and Azerbaijan to join the Abraham Accords with the goal to establish broader regional peace and stability.
US optimism about the South Caucasus peace process overlooks Armenia’s precarious position and the impossible choice it faces in finalizing an agreement. This article highlights how Azerbaijan’s intransigence during negotiations, the draft agreement’s disregard for social recognition and international law, and the top-down, elite-driven nature of the prospective peace deal combine to cast serious doubt on the potential success of a normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Following this development, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, whose portfolio includes the Russia-Ukraine war, Middle East hotspots and negotiations with Iran, expressed optimism for a final settlement and discussed the potential for Armenia and Azerbaijan to join the Abraham Accords with the goal to establish broader regional peace and stability.
US optimism about the South Caucasus peace process overlooks Armenia’s precarious position and the impossible choice it faces in finalizing an agreement. This article highlights how Azerbaijan’s intransigence during negotiations, the draft agreement’s disregard for social recognition and international law, and the top-down, elite-driven nature of the prospective peace deal combine to cast serious doubt on the potential success of a normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
A truck with the slogan "Karabakh is Azerbaijan" at the Baku Victory Parade on 10 December 2020. The parade was held in honor of the Azeri victory in the 2020 conflict. Source: Wiki Commons
A victor’s peace as seeding future tensions
Due to its weakened state after recent military conflicts with Azerbaijan, regional isolation and lack of significant leverage, Armenia faces considerable obstacles to achieving a peace settlement perceived as fair and durable. The 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War fundamentally shifted the balance of power in Azerbaijan’s favor, a shift that was solidified by the one-day war in 2023 that ended in the capture of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan and the mass exodus of 120,000 Armenians. This situation has forced Armenia to make concessions largely on terms set by Azerbaijan, which, facing no external constraints and enjoying a far superior military position, controls the negotiating process and dictates the key terms of a future peace accord.
Facing an existential dilemma and navigating diplomatic tensions with Russia, the Armenian government has sought to rebalance the negotiating process and address Armenia’s regional and international isolation.
These efforts include signing strategic partnerships with Western nations and establishing arms procurement contracts and military cooperation agreements with France and India. However, this has not incentivized Azerbaijan to reduce its appetite for territorial and political gains. Baku continues its demands for extraterritorial rights over the Zangezur corridor in Armenia’s Syunik Region, a link between the Azerbaijan “mainland” and its Nakhchivan exclave that Armenia considers a direct infringement on its territorial sovereignty.
Due to its weakened state after recent military conflicts with Azerbaijan, regional isolation and lack of significant leverage, Armenia faces considerable obstacles to achieving a peace settlement perceived as fair and durable. The 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War fundamentally shifted the balance of power in Azerbaijan’s favor, a shift that was solidified by the one-day war in 2023 that ended in the capture of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan and the mass exodus of 120,000 Armenians. This situation has forced Armenia to make concessions largely on terms set by Azerbaijan, which, facing no external constraints and enjoying a far superior military position, controls the negotiating process and dictates the key terms of a future peace accord.
Facing an existential dilemma and navigating diplomatic tensions with Russia, the Armenian government has sought to rebalance the negotiating process and address Armenia’s regional and international isolation.
These efforts include signing strategic partnerships with Western nations and establishing arms procurement contracts and military cooperation agreements with France and India. However, this has not incentivized Azerbaijan to reduce its appetite for territorial and political gains. Baku continues its demands for extraterritorial rights over the Zangezur corridor in Armenia’s Syunik Region, a link between the Azerbaijan “mainland” and its Nakhchivan exclave that Armenia considers a direct infringement on its territorial sovereignty.
“Few countries or international organizations are willing to pressure Azerbaijan into engaging in good faith negotiations with Armenia.”
The European energy market remains dependent on Azerbaijani gas and often overlooks Baku’s role in helping Russia to bypass energy sanctions. Unlike Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijan has no interest in joining the EU, instead strengthening ties with Turkey and engaging increasingly with Central Asian countries. The current geopolitical context, along with the weakening of the international liberal order, plays in favor of Azerbaijan’s intransigence and its unwillingness to make concessions. Overall, the heavy price of peace falls mostly on Yerevan’s shoulders, requiring its willingness to abandon its claims on Nagorno-Karabakh, forsake international justice for crimes committed since 2020 and ultimately compromise its sovereignty in relation to the Zangezur corridor.
On the battlefield, the EU Mission in Armenia and the Russian peacekeeping forces have thus far failed to level the playing field and prevent Azerbaijan from manufacturing crises and instrumentalizing the threat of war to achieve its strategic objectives. One of the primary conditions for a lasting peace is a binding commitment by both sides to renounce violence. Armenia appears to have accepted that a military resolution is not viable and that negotiations, despite the difficult choices involved, are the only path forward. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to wield force against Armenia, with border skirmishes, particularly in Syunik Region, highlighting the ongoing distance between the sides and an effective peace agreement.
Armenia remains in a vulnerable position: military action is not a realistic option and the limited foreign support restricts its ability to restore balance in the negotiating process. Azerbaijan’s escalating demands, without a reliable enforcement mechanism or an international guarantor, mean Armenia may be forced to negotiate recurrently under the threat of military force.
Nothing prevents Baku from instrumentalizing crises and increasing pressure on Yerevan to extract additional concessions. Furthermore, there are no existing mechanisms or willing parties to prevent Azerbaijan from reneging on a future peace agreement, despite Armenia’s significant concessions. The blockade of the Lachin corridordemonstrates how Baku is willing to bend international law and previous accords to achieve its goals.
Recall that in December 2022, Azerbaijan imposed a military blockade on the corridor, the only route linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, artificially creating a humanitarian crisis that lasted over nine months. While at first used as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions from Armenia on the Zangezur corridor, the blockade ultimately preceded the complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan’s armed forces in September 2023, in violation of the 2020 ceasefire accord. This precedent underlines how Azerbaijan, without an international guarantor, could renege on a new peace accord and target the Zangezur corridor in the future.
Lack of social reconciliation feeds cynicism and ethnic tensions
Besides quasi-official recognition of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, the most critical issue at hand in the March 2025 draft agreement concerns transitional justice and social reconciliation. Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to withdraw, dismiss or settle their legal disputes in international courts, particularly at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The ICJ is currently reviewing war crimes possibly committed during the 2020 war, including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage as a possible crime against humanity, alongside a countersuit from Azerbaijan. Abandoning these cases carries political and social costs that appear significantly higher than Armenia’s potential formal recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as sovereign Azerbaijani territory.
On the battlefield, the EU Mission in Armenia and the Russian peacekeeping forces have thus far failed to level the playing field and prevent Azerbaijan from manufacturing crises and instrumentalizing the threat of war to achieve its strategic objectives. One of the primary conditions for a lasting peace is a binding commitment by both sides to renounce violence. Armenia appears to have accepted that a military resolution is not viable and that negotiations, despite the difficult choices involved, are the only path forward. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to wield force against Armenia, with border skirmishes, particularly in Syunik Region, highlighting the ongoing distance between the sides and an effective peace agreement.
Armenia remains in a vulnerable position: military action is not a realistic option and the limited foreign support restricts its ability to restore balance in the negotiating process. Azerbaijan’s escalating demands, without a reliable enforcement mechanism or an international guarantor, mean Armenia may be forced to negotiate recurrently under the threat of military force.
Nothing prevents Baku from instrumentalizing crises and increasing pressure on Yerevan to extract additional concessions. Furthermore, there are no existing mechanisms or willing parties to prevent Azerbaijan from reneging on a future peace agreement, despite Armenia’s significant concessions. The blockade of the Lachin corridordemonstrates how Baku is willing to bend international law and previous accords to achieve its goals.
Recall that in December 2022, Azerbaijan imposed a military blockade on the corridor, the only route linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, artificially creating a humanitarian crisis that lasted over nine months. While at first used as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions from Armenia on the Zangezur corridor, the blockade ultimately preceded the complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan’s armed forces in September 2023, in violation of the 2020 ceasefire accord. This precedent underlines how Azerbaijan, without an international guarantor, could renege on a new peace accord and target the Zangezur corridor in the future.
Lack of social reconciliation feeds cynicism and ethnic tensions
Besides quasi-official recognition of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, the most critical issue at hand in the March 2025 draft agreement concerns transitional justice and social reconciliation. Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to withdraw, dismiss or settle their legal disputes in international courts, particularly at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The ICJ is currently reviewing war crimes possibly committed during the 2020 war, including the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage as a possible crime against humanity, alongside a countersuit from Azerbaijan. Abandoning these cases carries political and social costs that appear significantly higher than Armenia’s potential formal recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as sovereign Azerbaijani territory.
“A blanket amnesty for crimes rarely leads to a durable peace – on the contrary, it tends to feed corrosive grievances and mistrust toward international norms and institutions.”
The situation in the area after the 1994 ceasefire. Source: Wiki Commons
Addressing the most recent crimes through international legal mechanisms is a necessary first step, but it is also a perceived injustice in Azerbaijan that would increase in the long run support for Ilham Aliyev and his authoritarian regime.
Another significant deficiency in the current draft agreement is its failure to include provisions for addressing crimes committed by both sides during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-94) and their contribution to social polarization and ethnic tensions. Genuine peace would require Armenia and Azerbaijan to confront the crimes and atrocities committed throughout this protracted period of violence.
Both nations have entrenched and irreconcilable historical narratives, based on their own interpretation of the crimes and wrongdoings of the past four decades. These historical accounts of the war tend to focus almost exclusively on their own suffering, with little to no acknowledgment of their own culpability or wrongdoing.
Without concrete mechanisms for social reconciliation integrated into the peace process to address this deep-seated mistrust and generational trauma – compounded by the largely political nature of international legal proceedings – the peace process risks further alienating the civilian population on both sides, reinforcing trauma and cynicism toward human rights, and ultimately sowing the seed for a future conflict.
The limits of a top-down peace
While normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a necessary and promising first step, a sustainable peace must also prioritize the civilian population, i.e., their social divisions and willingness to accept a peace settlement. Top-down peace initiatives require political elites to actively prepare their societies for reconciliation, gradually involving them in the implementation of the agreements.
Another significant deficiency in the current draft agreement is its failure to include provisions for addressing crimes committed by both sides during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-94) and their contribution to social polarization and ethnic tensions. Genuine peace would require Armenia and Azerbaijan to confront the crimes and atrocities committed throughout this protracted period of violence.
Both nations have entrenched and irreconcilable historical narratives, based on their own interpretation of the crimes and wrongdoings of the past four decades. These historical accounts of the war tend to focus almost exclusively on their own suffering, with little to no acknowledgment of their own culpability or wrongdoing.
Without concrete mechanisms for social reconciliation integrated into the peace process to address this deep-seated mistrust and generational trauma – compounded by the largely political nature of international legal proceedings – the peace process risks further alienating the civilian population on both sides, reinforcing trauma and cynicism toward human rights, and ultimately sowing the seed for a future conflict.
The limits of a top-down peace
While normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a necessary and promising first step, a sustainable peace must also prioritize the civilian population, i.e., their social divisions and willingness to accept a peace settlement. Top-down peace initiatives require political elites to actively prepare their societies for reconciliation, gradually involving them in the implementation of the agreements.
“Armenian leaders may recognize the fragility of their bargaining position, but it remains unclear whether the broader population fully grasps this reality or is prepared to relinquish core elements of national identity and collective memory shaped by the conflict.”
Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. Source: Wiki Commons
The 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization represented a groundbreaking step toward peace in the Middle East, including a much-needed normalization of relations between the two belligerents. However, the failure to prepare both populations for such a dramatic shift in the narrative promoted by their governments and political elites led to widespread rejection of the accords and the empowerment of extremist factions on both sides.
A similar dynamic could emerge following the expected agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan if their populations are not actively considered and included in the peace process. It is also foolhardy to expect populations that have endured over 40 years of armed conflict and ethnic tensions in the post-Soviet era to shed their historical grievances suddenly and forget years of propaganda.
Engaging the local population, civil society and activists is crucial and can take many forms, including national dialogues, public consultations and consultative forums, or even more informal methods. The primary objective is to communicate the preliminary outcomes of the negotiations to the population while actively incorporating their perspectives. In top-down peace processes, this vital step is frequently overlooked or taken for granted rather than constituting a strategically planned phase.
Resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict requires specific considerations from both sides. For Armenian elites, there is a critical need to decouple the memory of the Armenian genocide from the conflict with Azerbaijan. This necessitates establishing distinct pathways for memorialization, ensuring that support for genocide recognition does not impede the peace process. Compounding this challenge is the fact that the Armenian population and its diaspora are still processing the trauma of losing Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) and the lack of justice for crimes committed during the recent war.
Meanwhile, the Aliyev regime has built its popular support around the objective of reclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh, favoring a military approach and celebrating the war itself. This support is continually reinforced through public displays of intolerance toward Armenians.
A similar dynamic could emerge following the expected agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan if their populations are not actively considered and included in the peace process. It is also foolhardy to expect populations that have endured over 40 years of armed conflict and ethnic tensions in the post-Soviet era to shed their historical grievances suddenly and forget years of propaganda.
Engaging the local population, civil society and activists is crucial and can take many forms, including national dialogues, public consultations and consultative forums, or even more informal methods. The primary objective is to communicate the preliminary outcomes of the negotiations to the population while actively incorporating their perspectives. In top-down peace processes, this vital step is frequently overlooked or taken for granted rather than constituting a strategically planned phase.
Resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict requires specific considerations from both sides. For Armenian elites, there is a critical need to decouple the memory of the Armenian genocide from the conflict with Azerbaijan. This necessitates establishing distinct pathways for memorialization, ensuring that support for genocide recognition does not impede the peace process. Compounding this challenge is the fact that the Armenian population and its diaspora are still processing the trauma of losing Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) and the lack of justice for crimes committed during the recent war.
Meanwhile, the Aliyev regime has built its popular support around the objective of reclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh, favoring a military approach and celebrating the war itself. This support is continually reinforced through public displays of intolerance toward Armenians.
“As a result, the Azerbaijani population appears mobilized behind the concept of a ‘victor’s peace’ to cement their military success against Armenia rather than the pursuit of a balanced agreement aimed at broader regional transformation.”
Unless a final settlement guarantees long-term stability and fosters a mutually beneficial economic and political partnership, which delivers rapid and tangible benefits to both societies, the imposition of a top-down, elite-driven agreement that denies people a voice and access to justice is likely to result in broad public rejection of the peace process.
Conclusion
Events in March have brought hope of a long-needed peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, the current peace process is unlikely to succeed unless it establishes mutually beneficial conditions, including a genuine reconciliation process on the societal level and an economic framework for peace. The recognition of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the abandonment of legal proceedings regarding crimes committed after 2020 are major concessions Armenia should only make if Azerbaijan demonstrates a firm commitment to peace. Even if Armenia embarks on such sacrifices to achieve a peace agreement, Azerbaijan’s adherence to its international obligations remains questionable in the context of Armenia’s current regional and international isolation and overall geopolitical vulnerability. Without international guarantors or significant international pressure, it seems unlikely that Azerbaijan will moderate its expanding demands.
Despite significant progress toward a peace since the 2020 and 2023 wars, the primary challenge lies in its implementation. While the limited window for striking a deal is recognized by both countries at an official level, their populations remain trapped in a conflict mindset, driven by ethnic polarization.
A critical barrier to lasting peace is the notable lack of transitional justice, including international or mutually agreed accountability mechanisms for human rights violations. This dearth of attention to reconciliation within the peace framework, exacerbated by concerns about Azerbaijan’s reliability as a partner, increases the likelihood of future armed conflict.
Conclusion
Events in March have brought hope of a long-needed peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, the current peace process is unlikely to succeed unless it establishes mutually beneficial conditions, including a genuine reconciliation process on the societal level and an economic framework for peace. The recognition of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the abandonment of legal proceedings regarding crimes committed after 2020 are major concessions Armenia should only make if Azerbaijan demonstrates a firm commitment to peace. Even if Armenia embarks on such sacrifices to achieve a peace agreement, Azerbaijan’s adherence to its international obligations remains questionable in the context of Armenia’s current regional and international isolation and overall geopolitical vulnerability. Without international guarantors or significant international pressure, it seems unlikely that Azerbaijan will moderate its expanding demands.
Despite significant progress toward a peace since the 2020 and 2023 wars, the primary challenge lies in its implementation. While the limited window for striking a deal is recognized by both countries at an official level, their populations remain trapped in a conflict mindset, driven by ethnic polarization.
A critical barrier to lasting peace is the notable lack of transitional justice, including international or mutually agreed accountability mechanisms for human rights violations. This dearth of attention to reconciliation within the peace framework, exacerbated by concerns about Azerbaijan’s reliability as a partner, increases the likelihood of future armed conflict.
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