POLITICS
How the Kremlin Is Playing the Armenian Parliamentary Election
May 19, 2026
Russia-Armenia relations have sunk to a post-Soviet low. Against this backdrop, Armenians will head to the polls in June for a parliamentary election in which incumbent PM Nikol Pashinyan and his ruling party remain the clear favorite. Still, Moscow-backed businessman Samvel Karapetyan – currently under house arrest in Armenia – could yet shake things up.
This is a translated and shortened version of an article originally published by Republic.
In Yerevan these days, all anyone talks about is the upcoming parliamentary election.
From the outside, that may seem strange – few doubt that incumbent PM Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party will emerge victorious. Polls put support for the ruling party at anywhere between 26% and 42%, well ahead of its main rivals in any scenario. The problem is that more than a quarter of voters remain undecided, while the prime minister’s potential allies are unlikely to make it into parliament. So even if he wins the most votes, Pashinyan may still fall short of the threshold needed to form a government.
That is the Kremlin’s dream – and a nightmare for Russian political emigrants, relokanty and “deserters” now living in Armenia. Nobody knows exactly how many Russians moved to the South Caucasus country after 2022, with estimates ranging from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand people. They do not participate in Armenian political life, but they are watching events closely.
Western leaders in Yerevan
Russia’s Mir bank cards are no longer accepted almost anywhere. Still, payments linked to them through QR codes continue to work. Meanwhile, Yandex’s taxi service functions perfectly well in rubles – despite what taxi drivers at the airport may tell you.
Any local taxi driver, upon learning that you are from Russia, will cautiously try to gauge your attitude toward Putin. Then – almost on cue, if he guesses correctly – he begins cursing Pashinyan and Zelensky, or perhaps Putin and his war, Macron and his wife, Trump and Vance, Gog and Magog – anything to keep the passenger happy.
Still, both Vance during his winter visit and European leaders in May received an exceptionally warm welcome in Yerevan. Many Armenians were genuinely puzzled by Moscow’s reaction to the early-May summit of the European Political Community in Yerevan.
Armenia hosted the leaders of around 50 countries, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, British PM Keir Starmer, Polish PM Donald Tusk, Canadian PM Mark Carney, Moldovan President Maia Sandu and, of course, Macron, who remains enormously popular in Armenia. For a small country, it was a major event – a genuine celebration.
From Moscow came the grumbling of prowar voenkory, alongside insults directed at the Armenian leader by Dmitri Medvedev, who described Pashinyan and Zelensky as two brainless Russophobes.
European guests also added fuel to the fire. In his speech at the summit, Macron noted that “4,000 Russian soldiers and more than 1,000 border guards are still stationed on Armenian territory” – implying that Armenia should be helped to rid itself of them.
In Yerevan these days, all anyone talks about is the upcoming parliamentary election.
From the outside, that may seem strange – few doubt that incumbent PM Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party will emerge victorious. Polls put support for the ruling party at anywhere between 26% and 42%, well ahead of its main rivals in any scenario. The problem is that more than a quarter of voters remain undecided, while the prime minister’s potential allies are unlikely to make it into parliament. So even if he wins the most votes, Pashinyan may still fall short of the threshold needed to form a government.
That is the Kremlin’s dream – and a nightmare for Russian political emigrants, relokanty and “deserters” now living in Armenia. Nobody knows exactly how many Russians moved to the South Caucasus country after 2022, with estimates ranging from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand people. They do not participate in Armenian political life, but they are watching events closely.
Western leaders in Yerevan
Russia’s Mir bank cards are no longer accepted almost anywhere. Still, payments linked to them through QR codes continue to work. Meanwhile, Yandex’s taxi service functions perfectly well in rubles – despite what taxi drivers at the airport may tell you.
Any local taxi driver, upon learning that you are from Russia, will cautiously try to gauge your attitude toward Putin. Then – almost on cue, if he guesses correctly – he begins cursing Pashinyan and Zelensky, or perhaps Putin and his war, Macron and his wife, Trump and Vance, Gog and Magog – anything to keep the passenger happy.
Still, both Vance during his winter visit and European leaders in May received an exceptionally warm welcome in Yerevan. Many Armenians were genuinely puzzled by Moscow’s reaction to the early-May summit of the European Political Community in Yerevan.
Armenia hosted the leaders of around 50 countries, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa, British PM Keir Starmer, Polish PM Donald Tusk, Canadian PM Mark Carney, Moldovan President Maia Sandu and, of course, Macron, who remains enormously popular in Armenia. For a small country, it was a major event – a genuine celebration.
From Moscow came the grumbling of prowar voenkory, alongside insults directed at the Armenian leader by Dmitri Medvedev, who described Pashinyan and Zelensky as two brainless Russophobes.
European guests also added fuel to the fire. In his speech at the summit, Macron noted that “4,000 Russian soldiers and more than 1,000 border guards are still stationed on Armenian territory” – implying that Armenia should be helped to rid itself of them.
Nikol Pashinyan with the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in 2020
Government.ru
Government.ru
Mineral water, cognac and marketplaces
Moscow has long wanted to punish the increasingly defiant Pashinyan, but so far it has little to show for its efforts.
On April 7, Russia’s alcohol and tobacco regulator filed a lawsuit seeking to revoke the license of Proshyan Brandy Factory, the largest Russian distributor of Armenian cognac. It alleges use of “alcohols of non-grape origin.”
Then, on April 10, Russia’s Investigative Committee unexpectedly reopened – citing “newly discovered circumstances” – a criminal case involving the February 2024 death of Vladikavkaz resident Oleg Gusov, who drank a bottle of Armenian Jermuk mineral water. At the same time, products sold by Armenian businesses began disappearing from marketplaces like Wildberries and Ozon, which cited “changes in customs procedures.”
Seemingly, the idea behind all this was to signal to Armenian voters that perhaps it was time to replace Pashinyan. But in Armenia, few seem to have got the message. Instead, people are asking pro-Russian politicians whether Moscow has completely lost its mind – and those politicians have nothing to say in response.
Especially since the problems began immediately after Pashinyan’s April 1 visit to the Kremlin, when the Armenian prime minister brought up internet freedom with Putin, while Putin publicly remarked that Armenia could not simultaneously belong to both the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU.
Pashinyan replied at the time that Armenia had not yet decided to pursue EU membership and could continue moving in that direction for quite a while. He did not explicitly say, “and there’s nothing you can do about it” – but he almost certainly thought it.
The thing is, Armenia’s prime minister understands perfectly well that it is no longer Yerevan that cannot escape Moscow – it is Moscow that can no longer do without Yerevan.
After 2022, Armenia became a major beneficiary of Western sanctions against Russia. Its GDP grew 12.6% in 2022, 8.3% in 2023 and 5.9% in 2024, according to World Bank and official data. The main drivers included reexportation of Western goods to Russia and the relocation of tens of thousands of IT workers and companies from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Trade with Russia reached $6.5 billion in 2024 before jumping to $11.0 billion in 2025.
The Kremlin has long been accustomed to blackmailing its neighbors by threatening to cut economic ties. But that tactic no longer frightens many of them. If Moscow tries to pressure Yerevan, how will Russia continue to get the “gray-market” goods that currently go through Armenia?
Thus, Moscow is left with little more than bans on certain brands of cognac and mineral water, along with a temporary freeze on Armenian businesses selling on Russian online marketplaces for a couple of weeks. In other words, it does not have much.
Kremlin-controlled media continue to churn out a steady stream of insults and hints that Armenia might face the same fate as Ukraine. But the effect appears to be the opposite. Moreover, the Armenian diaspora in Russia – upon whom all this rhetoric is dumped by the ton – does not vote in Armenian elections. To vote, they must go to Armenia, as there are no polling stations abroad.
Pro-Russian parties remain in the minority in virtually every poll. Meanwhile, Pashinyan’s party has used the Russian pressure campaign to mobilize supporters. Armenian Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan put it bluntly during an appearance on public television on May 2: “while in Ukraine they are trying to advance their interests through military means, in Armenia there is an attempt at a political operation, an attempt to seize power… We will not allow the Republic of Armenia to be turned into a ‘gubernia’ (a Russian province), we will not be governed like Belarus.”
Calling it “an attempt to seize power” is, admittedly, going too far. Then again, the leader of Armenia’s second-most-popular party is a Russian citizen.
Moscow has long wanted to punish the increasingly defiant Pashinyan, but so far it has little to show for its efforts.
On April 7, Russia’s alcohol and tobacco regulator filed a lawsuit seeking to revoke the license of Proshyan Brandy Factory, the largest Russian distributor of Armenian cognac. It alleges use of “alcohols of non-grape origin.”
Then, on April 10, Russia’s Investigative Committee unexpectedly reopened – citing “newly discovered circumstances” – a criminal case involving the February 2024 death of Vladikavkaz resident Oleg Gusov, who drank a bottle of Armenian Jermuk mineral water. At the same time, products sold by Armenian businesses began disappearing from marketplaces like Wildberries and Ozon, which cited “changes in customs procedures.”
Seemingly, the idea behind all this was to signal to Armenian voters that perhaps it was time to replace Pashinyan. But in Armenia, few seem to have got the message. Instead, people are asking pro-Russian politicians whether Moscow has completely lost its mind – and those politicians have nothing to say in response.
Especially since the problems began immediately after Pashinyan’s April 1 visit to the Kremlin, when the Armenian prime minister brought up internet freedom with Putin, while Putin publicly remarked that Armenia could not simultaneously belong to both the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU.
Pashinyan replied at the time that Armenia had not yet decided to pursue EU membership and could continue moving in that direction for quite a while. He did not explicitly say, “and there’s nothing you can do about it” – but he almost certainly thought it.
The thing is, Armenia’s prime minister understands perfectly well that it is no longer Yerevan that cannot escape Moscow – it is Moscow that can no longer do without Yerevan.
After 2022, Armenia became a major beneficiary of Western sanctions against Russia. Its GDP grew 12.6% in 2022, 8.3% in 2023 and 5.9% in 2024, according to World Bank and official data. The main drivers included reexportation of Western goods to Russia and the relocation of tens of thousands of IT workers and companies from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Trade with Russia reached $6.5 billion in 2024 before jumping to $11.0 billion in 2025.
The Kremlin has long been accustomed to blackmailing its neighbors by threatening to cut economic ties. But that tactic no longer frightens many of them. If Moscow tries to pressure Yerevan, how will Russia continue to get the “gray-market” goods that currently go through Armenia?
Thus, Moscow is left with little more than bans on certain brands of cognac and mineral water, along with a temporary freeze on Armenian businesses selling on Russian online marketplaces for a couple of weeks. In other words, it does not have much.
Kremlin-controlled media continue to churn out a steady stream of insults and hints that Armenia might face the same fate as Ukraine. But the effect appears to be the opposite. Moreover, the Armenian diaspora in Russia – upon whom all this rhetoric is dumped by the ton – does not vote in Armenian elections. To vote, they must go to Armenia, as there are no polling stations abroad.
Pro-Russian parties remain in the minority in virtually every poll. Meanwhile, Pashinyan’s party has used the Russian pressure campaign to mobilize supporters. Armenian Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan put it bluntly during an appearance on public television on May 2: “while in Ukraine they are trying to advance their interests through military means, in Armenia there is an attempt at a political operation, an attempt to seize power… We will not allow the Republic of Armenia to be turned into a ‘gubernia’ (a Russian province), we will not be governed like Belarus.”
Calling it “an attempt to seize power” is, admittedly, going too far. Then again, the leader of Armenia’s second-most-popular party is a Russian citizen.
Samvel Karapetyan
Alpha News / YouTube
Alpha News / YouTube
Moscow’s man in Yerevan
In this election, Moscow is all but openly backing Samvel Karapetyan. It was his case that Putin raised during that meeting with Pashinyan, awkwardly saying (mistakenly) that Karapetyan is being held somewhere, whereas he is, in fact, under house arrest.
Karapetyan is a Russian billionaire of Armenian heritage and the founder of the Tashir Group. Forbes estimates his fortune at $3.2 billion. His businesses are everywhere in Yerevan: Tashir Pizza outlets, upscale restaurants, shopping centers. In Moscow, he owns the Rio, Yerevan Plaza and Europark malls.
In other words, he has plenty to lose – whether in a conflict with the Kremlin or with Pashinyan.
A decade ago, Karapetyan’s company was given Electric Networks of Armenia free of charge. Then last year, Armenian authorities announced plans to nationalize the utility – formally over alleged violations, but in reality after Karapetyan publicly challenged Pashinyan during the latter’s confrontation with senior Church figures.
Soon afterward, the billionaire was detained on charges of “public calls to seize power.” Additional accusations of tax evasion and money laundering followed shortly thereafter. Since December, he has been under house arrest, which courts have regularly extended.
During that time, Karapetyan managed to launch the Mer Dzevov (In Our Way) movement and later the Strong Armenia party. According to polling, the party could come in second in the parliamentary election with 13-17% of the vote.
While Karapetyan remains under arrest, his nephew is leading the campaign. The main issue, however, is that despite his popularity, Karapetyan cannot legally become prime minister under Armenian law because he holds dual citizenship. Even if he renounces his Russian citizenship, he will not meet the requirement to have resided in Armenia for at least four years.
The billionaire’s allies insist that they will simply rewrite the law to accommodate him. For now, they have little chance of securing enough seats to amend the constitution, however.
Not even in alliance with Armenia’s third-most-popular political force – former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia bloc. That, incidentally, is another weak point for Strong Armenia: neither the party leader nor his deputies particularly enjoy questions about whom they would be willing to join in coalition with. Nobody wants to be associated with Kocharyan – the leader of the so-called Karabakh clan and the central figure in virtually every major corruption scandal in modern Armenian politics.
‘Privet, Rob!’
In September 2001, at Yerevan’s Aragast café (nicknamed Poplavok by Russian speakers), Georgian citizen of Armenian heritage and Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) member Pogos Pogosyan spotted then-President Kocharyan sitting at a nearby table and disrespectfully called out to him: “privet, Rob!” Minutes later, Pogosyan was found dead in the restroom. Witnesses said Kocharyan’s bodyguards beat him to death – and few in Yerevan doubt they were acting on someone else’s orders.
As astonishing as it may seem, Kocharyan remains active in politics. Polls give him between 4% and 8% support – good enough for third place nationally.
But Kocharyan’s disapproval ratings are equally historic. Armenians remember not only the Poplavok murder, but also the violent dispersal of demonstrations on March 1, 2008, which left almost a dozen dead, along with the staggering corruption under Kocharyan’s rule. It was corruption on such a scale that famed philanthropist Kirk Kerkorian eventually halted his financial support for Armenia and rewrote his will.
Still, the former president retains considerable support among compatriots who relocated to Armenia after defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
When the Pashinyan-Karapetyan affair was just starting to escalate, Kocharyan dismissed the attacks on the oligarch as “nonsense” and publicly backed the Russian businessman. Soon afterward, a Yerevan court ordered the exhumation of Pogosyan’s body nearly a quarter century after the murder.
That also gave Pashinyan’s team an opening to accuse Karapetyan, Kocharyan and another opposition figure, Gagik Tsarukyan, of forming an alliance with the goal of restarting the war with Azerbaijan.
The accusation sounds dubious. Still, in Yerevan almost nobody holds back from criticizing Pashinyan’s peace deal with Aliyev. The prime minister is attacked for “handing over Karabakh,” improperly demarcating the border allegedly so that Armenian villages end up outside of the country and removing Mount Ararat from Armenian passport stamps at the behest of Turkey.
At the same time, when critics are asked what exactly they would change – Will they put Ararat back on passport stamps? Will they launch a war against Azerbaijan? – straightforward answers are rarely forthcoming.
Most importantly, however, Kocharyan himself has no ambitions of becoming prime minister. Instead, he wants to remain useful to Karapetyan if the latter finishes second and seeks to build a coalition. And that scenario remains entirely plausible.
In this election, Moscow is all but openly backing Samvel Karapetyan. It was his case that Putin raised during that meeting with Pashinyan, awkwardly saying (mistakenly) that Karapetyan is being held somewhere, whereas he is, in fact, under house arrest.
Karapetyan is a Russian billionaire of Armenian heritage and the founder of the Tashir Group. Forbes estimates his fortune at $3.2 billion. His businesses are everywhere in Yerevan: Tashir Pizza outlets, upscale restaurants, shopping centers. In Moscow, he owns the Rio, Yerevan Plaza and Europark malls.
In other words, he has plenty to lose – whether in a conflict with the Kremlin or with Pashinyan.
A decade ago, Karapetyan’s company was given Electric Networks of Armenia free of charge. Then last year, Armenian authorities announced plans to nationalize the utility – formally over alleged violations, but in reality after Karapetyan publicly challenged Pashinyan during the latter’s confrontation with senior Church figures.
Soon afterward, the billionaire was detained on charges of “public calls to seize power.” Additional accusations of tax evasion and money laundering followed shortly thereafter. Since December, he has been under house arrest, which courts have regularly extended.
During that time, Karapetyan managed to launch the Mer Dzevov (In Our Way) movement and later the Strong Armenia party. According to polling, the party could come in second in the parliamentary election with 13-17% of the vote.
While Karapetyan remains under arrest, his nephew is leading the campaign. The main issue, however, is that despite his popularity, Karapetyan cannot legally become prime minister under Armenian law because he holds dual citizenship. Even if he renounces his Russian citizenship, he will not meet the requirement to have resided in Armenia for at least four years.
The billionaire’s allies insist that they will simply rewrite the law to accommodate him. For now, they have little chance of securing enough seats to amend the constitution, however.
Not even in alliance with Armenia’s third-most-popular political force – former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia bloc. That, incidentally, is another weak point for Strong Armenia: neither the party leader nor his deputies particularly enjoy questions about whom they would be willing to join in coalition with. Nobody wants to be associated with Kocharyan – the leader of the so-called Karabakh clan and the central figure in virtually every major corruption scandal in modern Armenian politics.
‘Privet, Rob!’
In September 2001, at Yerevan’s Aragast café (nicknamed Poplavok by Russian speakers), Georgian citizen of Armenian heritage and Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) member Pogos Pogosyan spotted then-President Kocharyan sitting at a nearby table and disrespectfully called out to him: “privet, Rob!” Minutes later, Pogosyan was found dead in the restroom. Witnesses said Kocharyan’s bodyguards beat him to death – and few in Yerevan doubt they were acting on someone else’s orders.
As astonishing as it may seem, Kocharyan remains active in politics. Polls give him between 4% and 8% support – good enough for third place nationally.
But Kocharyan’s disapproval ratings are equally historic. Armenians remember not only the Poplavok murder, but also the violent dispersal of demonstrations on March 1, 2008, which left almost a dozen dead, along with the staggering corruption under Kocharyan’s rule. It was corruption on such a scale that famed philanthropist Kirk Kerkorian eventually halted his financial support for Armenia and rewrote his will.
Still, the former president retains considerable support among compatriots who relocated to Armenia after defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
When the Pashinyan-Karapetyan affair was just starting to escalate, Kocharyan dismissed the attacks on the oligarch as “nonsense” and publicly backed the Russian businessman. Soon afterward, a Yerevan court ordered the exhumation of Pogosyan’s body nearly a quarter century after the murder.
That also gave Pashinyan’s team an opening to accuse Karapetyan, Kocharyan and another opposition figure, Gagik Tsarukyan, of forming an alliance with the goal of restarting the war with Azerbaijan.
The accusation sounds dubious. Still, in Yerevan almost nobody holds back from criticizing Pashinyan’s peace deal with Aliyev. The prime minister is attacked for “handing over Karabakh,” improperly demarcating the border allegedly so that Armenian villages end up outside of the country and removing Mount Ararat from Armenian passport stamps at the behest of Turkey.
At the same time, when critics are asked what exactly they would change – Will they put Ararat back on passport stamps? Will they launch a war against Azerbaijan? – straightforward answers are rarely forthcoming.
Most importantly, however, Kocharyan himself has no ambitions of becoming prime minister. Instead, he wants to remain useful to Karapetyan if the latter finishes second and seeks to build a coalition. And that scenario remains entirely plausible.
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