ECONOMY
Study Explores How Russian Billionaires Have Navigated Sanctions
February 2, 2026
Every other Russian billionaire has increased their presence in the domestic market, while nearly 60% of sanctioned billionaires have moved in the opposite direction, divesting Russian assets.
This article is a shortened, translated version of a piece published by RBC.
According to Forbes, Russia ranked fifth last year based on the number of billionaires, behind the US, China, India and Germany, despite the sanctions pressure faced by the Russian super-rich after 2022. In total, more than 140 Russians were worth at least $1 billion in 2025.
Three-quarters of those on the list in the last prewar year of 2021 remained on it, according to Elena Shvetsova of the Institute for Social Policy at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Shvetsova analyzed how the 125 billionaires on the Russia Forbes list for 2024 behaved between February 2022 and January 2025 in response to sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, the UK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
Until 2022, between half and two thirds of Russian billionaires’ assets were located outside of Russia, Shvetsova says. The vulnerability of these assets necessitated quick strategies to adapt to the new conditions, which varied depending both on the size and nature of the assets, as well as on the type of restrictions faced by individual billionaires.
According to Forbes, Russia ranked fifth last year based on the number of billionaires, behind the US, China, India and Germany, despite the sanctions pressure faced by the Russian super-rich after 2022. In total, more than 140 Russians were worth at least $1 billion in 2025.
Three-quarters of those on the list in the last prewar year of 2021 remained on it, according to Elena Shvetsova of the Institute for Social Policy at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Shvetsova analyzed how the 125 billionaires on the Russia Forbes list for 2024 behaved between February 2022 and January 2025 in response to sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, the UK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
Until 2022, between half and two thirds of Russian billionaires’ assets were located outside of Russia, Shvetsova says. The vulnerability of these assets necessitated quick strategies to adapt to the new conditions, which varied depending both on the size and nature of the assets, as well as on the type of restrictions faced by individual billionaires.
Irina Chishkova / Unsplash
Different strategies
Every other billionaire during this period expanded their assets in Russia, Shvetsova found. Every third resorted to complicating ownership structures by transferring asset management to affiliated individuals or funds or by preemptively and indirectly reducing their ownership stake. Every sixth sold their assets abroad.
Shvetsova emphasizes the sharp differences between the top 20 billionaires and the rest of the list: whereas 65% of the top 20 operate in the real economy, the proportion for the remaining billionaires is just 30%. Three-quarters of the top 20 were subject to Western sanctions, versus 42% for the rest.
The top 20 were more active in purchasing assets abroad and selling assets in Russia. Sanctions were intended in part to isolate Russian billionaires and their business structures; in practice, however, the opposite has often been the case, Shvetsova argues. By contrast, the rest of the list invested more in Russia.
These differences reflect different sources of capital and sectoral specializations, says Anastasia Vladimirova, managing partner at IPM Consulting. “The top 20 billionaires typically earned their wealth in export-oriented sectors, and their business models critically depend on access to global markets and Western financing. It is logical that sanctions dealt the most devastating blow to these businesses,” she says, “creating incentives to diversify with foreign assets not connected to Russia.”
Billionaires with smaller fortunes are more often associated with domestically oriented sectors like retail, development, food production, construction and financial services. Their businesses depend on Russian consumer demand and infrastructure, meaning an expanded presence in the domestic market in the era of sanctions is a step forward, Vladimirova notes.
Meanwhile, 10 billionaires have renounced their Russian citizenship, Shvetsova writes. This strategy of distancing was most common in IT, finance and venture capital – sectors not tied to substantial tangible assets in Russia. “New institutional conditions,” she says, “have literally given rise to a new institutional phenomenon: billionaires who are [labeled by the Russian government as] ‘foreign agents’ and ‘extremists.’”
The impact of sanctions
Half of the latest Russian billionaire list is not subject to any sanctions, Shvetsova points out. Among those who were sanctioned, most fell under what she terms “third-order sanctions” – measures imposed by the UK, Japan, New Zealand and Australia that restrict business activity within their jurisdictions but do not cause significant damage.
The toughest US sanctions were applied to 37 Russian billionaires. Among them, 23 are subject to sanctions from both the US and the EU, and 21 were hit by what Shvetsova calls “sanctions bombing” by the US, the EU and other jurisdictions simultaneously.
Billionaires who were not sanctioned have actively invested in domestic projects, strengthening their influence in the Russian market. Nearly 60% of this group did so, Shvetsova estimates. Among those facing the most severe sanctions pressure, the figure was below 40%. At the same time, roughly a quarter of sanctioned billionaires were forced to sell their foreign assets quickly.
Their approaches to ownership rights also differed sharply. Only 15% of billionaires untouched by sanctions have resorted to transferring assets to affiliated persons, versus 62% among those under the toughest restrictions.
Every other billionaire during this period expanded their assets in Russia, Shvetsova found. Every third resorted to complicating ownership structures by transferring asset management to affiliated individuals or funds or by preemptively and indirectly reducing their ownership stake. Every sixth sold their assets abroad.
Shvetsova emphasizes the sharp differences between the top 20 billionaires and the rest of the list: whereas 65% of the top 20 operate in the real economy, the proportion for the remaining billionaires is just 30%. Three-quarters of the top 20 were subject to Western sanctions, versus 42% for the rest.
The top 20 were more active in purchasing assets abroad and selling assets in Russia. Sanctions were intended in part to isolate Russian billionaires and their business structures; in practice, however, the opposite has often been the case, Shvetsova argues. By contrast, the rest of the list invested more in Russia.
These differences reflect different sources of capital and sectoral specializations, says Anastasia Vladimirova, managing partner at IPM Consulting. “The top 20 billionaires typically earned their wealth in export-oriented sectors, and their business models critically depend on access to global markets and Western financing. It is logical that sanctions dealt the most devastating blow to these businesses,” she says, “creating incentives to diversify with foreign assets not connected to Russia.”
Billionaires with smaller fortunes are more often associated with domestically oriented sectors like retail, development, food production, construction and financial services. Their businesses depend on Russian consumer demand and infrastructure, meaning an expanded presence in the domestic market in the era of sanctions is a step forward, Vladimirova notes.
Meanwhile, 10 billionaires have renounced their Russian citizenship, Shvetsova writes. This strategy of distancing was most common in IT, finance and venture capital – sectors not tied to substantial tangible assets in Russia. “New institutional conditions,” she says, “have literally given rise to a new institutional phenomenon: billionaires who are [labeled by the Russian government as] ‘foreign agents’ and ‘extremists.’”
The impact of sanctions
Half of the latest Russian billionaire list is not subject to any sanctions, Shvetsova points out. Among those who were sanctioned, most fell under what she terms “third-order sanctions” – measures imposed by the UK, Japan, New Zealand and Australia that restrict business activity within their jurisdictions but do not cause significant damage.
The toughest US sanctions were applied to 37 Russian billionaires. Among them, 23 are subject to sanctions from both the US and the EU, and 21 were hit by what Shvetsova calls “sanctions bombing” by the US, the EU and other jurisdictions simultaneously.
Billionaires who were not sanctioned have actively invested in domestic projects, strengthening their influence in the Russian market. Nearly 60% of this group did so, Shvetsova estimates. Among those facing the most severe sanctions pressure, the figure was below 40%. At the same time, roughly a quarter of sanctioned billionaires were forced to sell their foreign assets quickly.
Their approaches to ownership rights also differed sharply. Only 15% of billionaires untouched by sanctions have resorted to transferring assets to affiliated persons, versus 62% among those under the toughest restrictions.
Yaroslav Zotov / Unsplash
Balancing risks and opportunities
“Differences in adaptation strategies may be conditioned by the balance between risks and opportunities,” says Vladimir Eremkin, senior researcher at the Institute of Psychological and Economic Research (IPEI) within the Russian Presidential Academy. “Billionaires under direct sanctions-related restrictions have shifted to searching for opportunities to preserve their assets or contesting sanctions, while opportunities for expansion and development take secondary importance.”
The reason some billionaires actively invested domestically despite limited external pressure, while others in the top 20 under tough sanctions increased activity abroad, is “quite banal,” Eremkin adds. Sanctions were designed to inflict maximum damage and thus targeted the largest billionaires whose businesses are tied to Western markets. “As a result, in an effort to preserve a substantial portion of their business, they intensified their activities abroad,” he explains.
This may have involved selling existing assets – possibly at a discount – or acquiring new ones to move parts of their business out from under sanctions. Many of these billionaires have not lived in Russia with their families for years, which makes it important for them to keep open financial opportunities outside of the country, Eremkin notes.
Sanctions provided those whose wealth depended heavily on the domestic market with a window for investment. They sought to take advantage of this by acquiring assets at distressed prices, investing in import-substitution projects and trying to meet growing demand from both the state and the population.
Loyalty also played a role, Eremkin adds. By signaling support for government policy, owners of large businesses reduced the risk of having their assets nationalized and received benefits such as government contracts, preferential loans and other forms of support.
The high proportion of sanctioned billionaires transferring ownership to affiliated persons reflects a standard legal strategy of protecting assets by muddying their ownership structures, Vladimirova explains. “Such transfers formally take assets out of direct control by sanctioned individuals, creating legal grounds for challenging sanctions or at least complicating their enforcement.”
Cutting the cord
Inclusion in US sanctions lists – the most restrictive regime – especially when combined with similar EU measures, most often led to changes in or complication of ownership structures through transfers to affiliated persons or trusts, Shvetsova’s study shows.
US-sanctioned billionaires were particularly interested in acquiring assets from companies exiting the Russian market. Uncertainty may have encouraged them to pursue acceptably profitable deals, Shvetsova suggests. By late 2024, the legally mandated discount on sales of Russian assets owned by foreign companies was at least 50%, rising to a minimum of 60% in the fourth quarter of the year, she recalls.
Those affected by EU sanctions tended to act preemptively, selling foreign assets before they could be blocked and complicating ownership structures in advance.
Nearly 60% of billionaires under pressure from the EU and the US, or from all sanctioning jurisdictions simultaneously, have taken steps to reduce their businesses in Russia, Shvetsova notes. This was likely driven, she believes, by a desire to “neutralize” their connection to Russia with the ultimate goal of challenging the restrictions.
Eremkin argues that the different reactions to sanctions are driven by the severity and extraterritorial reach of the measures, as well as by the remaining scope for maneuver, negotiation or legal contestation.
Though it is impossible to say all these actions were driven solely by sanctions, Shvetsova concedes, the divergence in behavior between the two groups suggests that sanctions have nevertheless had a significant impact on billionaires’ behavior and strategy.
“Differences in adaptation strategies may be conditioned by the balance between risks and opportunities,” says Vladimir Eremkin, senior researcher at the Institute of Psychological and Economic Research (IPEI) within the Russian Presidential Academy. “Billionaires under direct sanctions-related restrictions have shifted to searching for opportunities to preserve their assets or contesting sanctions, while opportunities for expansion and development take secondary importance.”
The reason some billionaires actively invested domestically despite limited external pressure, while others in the top 20 under tough sanctions increased activity abroad, is “quite banal,” Eremkin adds. Sanctions were designed to inflict maximum damage and thus targeted the largest billionaires whose businesses are tied to Western markets. “As a result, in an effort to preserve a substantial portion of their business, they intensified their activities abroad,” he explains.
This may have involved selling existing assets – possibly at a discount – or acquiring new ones to move parts of their business out from under sanctions. Many of these billionaires have not lived in Russia with their families for years, which makes it important for them to keep open financial opportunities outside of the country, Eremkin notes.
Sanctions provided those whose wealth depended heavily on the domestic market with a window for investment. They sought to take advantage of this by acquiring assets at distressed prices, investing in import-substitution projects and trying to meet growing demand from both the state and the population.
Loyalty also played a role, Eremkin adds. By signaling support for government policy, owners of large businesses reduced the risk of having their assets nationalized and received benefits such as government contracts, preferential loans and other forms of support.
The high proportion of sanctioned billionaires transferring ownership to affiliated persons reflects a standard legal strategy of protecting assets by muddying their ownership structures, Vladimirova explains. “Such transfers formally take assets out of direct control by sanctioned individuals, creating legal grounds for challenging sanctions or at least complicating their enforcement.”
Cutting the cord
Inclusion in US sanctions lists – the most restrictive regime – especially when combined with similar EU measures, most often led to changes in or complication of ownership structures through transfers to affiliated persons or trusts, Shvetsova’s study shows.
US-sanctioned billionaires were particularly interested in acquiring assets from companies exiting the Russian market. Uncertainty may have encouraged them to pursue acceptably profitable deals, Shvetsova suggests. By late 2024, the legally mandated discount on sales of Russian assets owned by foreign companies was at least 50%, rising to a minimum of 60% in the fourth quarter of the year, she recalls.
Those affected by EU sanctions tended to act preemptively, selling foreign assets before they could be blocked and complicating ownership structures in advance.
Nearly 60% of billionaires under pressure from the EU and the US, or from all sanctioning jurisdictions simultaneously, have taken steps to reduce their businesses in Russia, Shvetsova notes. This was likely driven, she believes, by a desire to “neutralize” their connection to Russia with the ultimate goal of challenging the restrictions.
Eremkin argues that the different reactions to sanctions are driven by the severity and extraterritorial reach of the measures, as well as by the remaining scope for maneuver, negotiation or legal contestation.
Though it is impossible to say all these actions were driven solely by sanctions, Shvetsova concedes, the divergence in behavior between the two groups suggests that sanctions have nevertheless had a significant impact on billionaires’ behavior and strategy.
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